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1 Introduction:  
1 1 Analysing a Dispute: DS506: Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of 
Bovine Meat 
On the 4th April 2016 Brazil requested consultations with Indonesia regarding certain measures 
imposed by Indonesia on the importation of meat from cattle belonging to the species Bos 
Taurus. Brazil claims that the measures are inconsistent with several provisions of the GATT 
19941; the SPS Agreement2; and the TBT Agreement3. Should this dispute come before the 
Panel (and perhaps even the Appellate Body) it will present the Dispute Settlement Body with 
an opportunity to clear up some of the interpretational issues with the SPS Agreement. It will 
further present the Body with an opportunity to demonstrate that it is alive to the numerous and 
cumbersome burdens faced by many developing country Members in the implementation of 
the SPS Agreement and rule accordingly. For the purposes of this discussion the focus shall 
solely be on the SPS Agreement.  
What Brazil is arguing, briefly stated, is that Indonesia applied restrictive rules and 
procedures to Brazil’s exports of bovine meat (hereafter beef), which have the effect of 
prohibiting Brazil from accessing Indonesia’s market. Brazil have claimed that Indonesia has 
discriminated against Brazil’s beef when compared to its treatment of other importing 
countries.  
In its request, Brazil explains that they have failed to obtain approval for the importation 
of Brazilian beef into Indonesia’s territory. They explain that this is as a result of Indonesia’s 
maintenance and adoption of restrictive rules and procedures which have the effect of 
prohibiting or restricting Brazilian beef from entering the Indonesian market. Brazil pointed to 
both a general measure as well as specific measures which they alleged violated the above-
mentioned provisions of the GATT 1994; the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. In 
terms of the general measure Brazil argued that Indonesia’s restrictive measures are imposed 
through a combination of legal instruments, administrative actions and omissions that result in 
an import ban on certain bovine meat products; in a quantitative restriction on other bovine 
meats; and in an evidenced discrimination between Brazil and other suppliers of these 
                                                 
1 Articles I:1, II:1, III:4, III:9, VIII:1(c), VIII:3, X:3(a) and XI:1. 
2 Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, 5.7, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 7, 8. 
3 Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 5.1 and 5.2. 
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products.4 Brazil also explained that they have reason to believe that in connection with these 
restrictions there are other measures and regulations adopted by Indonesia which appear to 
further constrain Brazilian beef exports. These include the prohibition of importation of bovine 
meat when domestic production is deemed to be sufficient to fulfil domestic demand; the 
prohibition or restriction of imports of certain animal products when the prices of these 
products fall below certain reference prices; importation being allowed only to certain types of 
use; and the trade restrictive rules regarding shipping, warehousing and transportation.5 
Brazil explains that they take specific issue with the fact that Indonesia only accepts 
imports of bovine meat from countries that have entire territory declared as free of Foot and 
Mouth Disease (FMD), regardless of the fact that bovine meat from disease-free states or 
regions, with or without vaccination, holds the same sanitary status. Brazil argues that by 
failing to adopt the principle of regionalisation, Indonesia imposes a de facto prohibition on 
the importation of Brazilian bovine meat into its territory, by means of a sanitary measure that 
is against the relevant international standard and guideline governing the issue, without any 
sort of scientific justification or without being based on a proper risk assessment. Brazil also 
argues that the measure is more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the appropriate level 
of protection.  
Brazil further specifically states that while it has no issue in what concerns the 
international standard for halal products in itself, it is concerned with the different treatment 
bestowed on beef from different origins.  
Brazil alleges that Indonesia unduly restricts market access of bovine meat through a 
non-transparent and intricate import-licensing regime. This regime requires at least 5 form 
steps, the effort of these numerous complicated steps results in a significant obstacle to the 
acquisition of such license.6 These licenses and recommendations, all with strict deadlines, may 
restrict the ports of entry of the imports, and are (as Brazil argues) are not administered in a 
transparent manner. Brazil understands that Indonesia has failed to comply with notification 
                                                 
4 Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Bovine Meath. Request for Consultations by Brazil. 
WT/DS506/1.G/L/1145 G G/SPS/GEN/1486, G/LIC/D/50, G/TBT/D/49, G/AG/GEN/130. (7 April 2016). 
5 Indonesia – Bovine Meat (2016). 
6 This process requires at least five formal steps: (i) "Trade Operation Permit" (SIUP), as foreseen in MoT 
Regulation 36/2007; (ii) "Certificate of Customs Registration" (SRP), established by the Decree of the Minister 
of Finance number 454/KMK.04/2002, as amended by Decree of Minister of Finance number 549/KMK.04/2002; 
(iii) "Importer Identification Number" (API), defined in MoT Regulation 48/2015; (iv) "Recommendation from 
the Minister of Agriculture", as provided for in MoA Regulation 58/2015, according to Article 10 of Regulation 
05/2016; and (v) "Import Approval from the Minister of Trade", according to Article 9 of MoT Regulation 
05/2016. 
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obligations and publication requirements under the GATT 1994 (and the Import and Licensing 
Agreement), thus creating trade restrictive and distortive effects on imports of bovine meat. 
Brazil argues that this adds to the inconsistences with WTO obligations held by Indonesia.  
 1 2  Harmonisation and Regionalisation within the Dispute 
This paper will not seek to resolve the whole dispute, but instead seeks to identify certain 
specific questions regarding the SPS Agreement and examine these issues in the same manner 
a Dispute Settlement Body would. The first line of questioning will relate to whether 
Indonesia’s conduct (as set out by Brazil) amounted to a violation of the Harmonization 
obligations imposed by Art 3.1; 3.2 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement? In other words, has 
Indonesia failed to harmonize their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as 
possible, or have they failed to base their measures on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations? If this is the case, are such non-conforming measures necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health? Are such measures consistent with the provisions of the 
SPS Agreement? Related to this question, in relation to the measures which do not comply with 
international standards, guideline or recommendation, is there a scientific justification behind 
these measures?  
The second line of questioning centres around the issue of whether or not Indonesia has 
adapted their SPS measures to regional conditions? In other words, do Indonesia’s measures 
taken in regards to Foot and Mouth Disease recognise the concept of pest or disease free areas 
and areas of low pest or disease prevalence? Of specific relevance here is the fact that Indonesia 
has adopted a practice of accepting imports of beef from countries that have had their entire 
territory declared as free of FMD, regardless of the fact that beef from disease-free states or 
regions, with or without vaccination, holds the same sanitary status. (Art 6.1; 6.2 and 6.3 are 
all relevant here).  
Due to the fact that Indonesia is yet to answer these claims, as the dispute is still 
currently in the process of consultations, I am forced to test the strength of Brazil’s arguments 
without Indonesia’s comments, arguments or evidence to the contrary.  
1 3 Background Information to the Dispute 
It makes sense that Brazil has raised issues relating to Article 6 (regionalisation) as the WTO 
explains that it is geographically larger Members that voice objections to blanket bans on all 
their exports when a disease only exists in some regions. Furthermore, Brazil is the second 
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largest commercial beef producer in the world, with the United States being the first.7 Brazil is 
taking active steps to intensify their beef production sector, gaining access into the Indonesian 
market would be a step in the right direction of this objective.8 This is aimed to push their beef 
industry into high-value export markets.9 Renato Rasmussen (Rabobank) has explained that 
Brazil is well placed to fulfil the needs of developing countries which are experiencing a dietary 
shift towards higher protein content.10 Rasmussen has explained that this is due to the country’s 
potential and ability to expand corn and soybean production.11 (Corn and Soybeans are 
commonly used in animal feed.)  
The number of countries ‘eligible’ to export beef to Indonesia is limited to Australia, 
New Zealand and the United States of America., with Australia being largest export of beef to 
Indonesia.12  Factors such as low import quotas, the high price of Australian exports and the 
shortage in domestic production have all contributed to high beef product prices. This has, to 
the advantage of Brazil, placed pressure on the Indonesian government to consider Brazilian 
beef products.13 This pressure is relevant in the context of this dispute as it as an illustration of 
how Indonesia’s strict SPS measures in relation to the importation of beef have had an effect 
on the price that Indonesian citizens pay. It illustrates how the SPS measures have resulted in 
a significant trade barrier and how such has directly impacted consumers. 
The Foot and Mouth Disease, which can be introduced through the importation of fresh 
meat as well as frozen meat, is an obvious biosecurity risk. This risk, however, is not only a 
concern for local industry, but also for exporters of beef to Indonesia. Here, Australia would 
                                                 
7 “The Brazilian Beef Industry: Just how Big Is It?” < https://www.agriland.ie/farming-news/the-brazilian-beef-
industry-just-how-big-is-it/> ( accessed 15-12-2018). 
8 Georgi Gyton “Brazil looks to ramp up beef product as global demand hots up” 
https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2014/10/20/Brazil-looks-to-ramp-up-beef-production-as-global-
demand-hots-up> (accessed 15-12-2018). 
9 Georgi Gyton “Brazil looks to ramp up beef product as global demand hots up” 
https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2014/10/20/Brazil-looks-to-ramp-up-beef-production-as-global-
demand-hots-up> (accessed 15-12-2018). 
10 Georgi Gyton “Brazil looks to ramp up beef product as global demand hots up” 
https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2014/10/20/Brazil-looks-to-ramp-up-beef-production-as-global-
demand-hots-up> (accessed 15-12-2018).  
11 Georgi Gyton “Brazil looks to ramp up beef product as global demand hots up” 
https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2014/10/20/Brazil-looks-to-ramp-up-beef-production-as-global-
demand-hots-up> (accessed 15-12-2018). 
12 Georigi Gyrton “Brazil persevers with efforts to open Indonesian market” 
https://www.globalmeatnews.com/Article/2014/08/29/Brazil-initiates-WTO-dispute-with-Indonesia-over-beef-
imports (accessed 15-12-2018). 
13 Adelaide Knowles “High Price of Beef Driving Indonesian Shift on Imports” < 
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/high-price-beef-driving-indonesian-shift-imports/> (accessed on 
15-12-2018). 
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identify itself as being at risk.14 This is because of its proximity and exposure through trade, 
with Indonesia. This risk is increased by the fact that Australia does not immunise against foot 
and mouth disease (as FMD has been declared non-existent in Australia). This means that if 
there was to be an out-break it would spread rapidly among Australian livestock.15 The impact 
of FMD can be devastating. These impacts can be divided into two different groups; direct 
losses, which occur as a result of reduced production and changes in herd structures16 and 
indirect losses, caused by the expense of FMD control, poor access to markets (as has been 
illustrated by Brazil) and the limited usage of improved production technologies.17 The disease 
is severe and highly contagious. It is therefore understandable that Indonesia would want to 
protect against the manifestation of the risks that FMD carries.  
An example of the risk that FMD carriers, and the problems which occur when such 
risk materialises: A recent outbreak of FMD in our own boarders, South Africa, has already 
had a devastating effect on trade. FMD was identified in cattle in the Province of Limpopo. 
This has had the result of South Africa’s status as an FMD-free country to be suspended. This 
will have a further impact in that exports where an FMD-free zone attestation is required will 
not be able to get such. As a result, a provincial pan on importing meat products from South 
Africa has been announced by several of our trading partners as a precautionary action to avoid 
the risk of outbreak in their territories. Therefore, not only will there be the cost associated with 
managing and controlling this outbreak, but we will suffer great losses in trade. Can one blame 
Indonesia for taking active steps to avoid such loss? 
2  Background 
Both the Agreement of the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS 
Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement) grant 
certain rights and create certain obligations for WTO Member States, with their overall purpose 
being the protection of human, plant and animal health and the ensuring of product quality and 
                                                 
14Adelaide Knowles “High Price of Beef Driving Indonesian Shift on Imports” < 
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/high-price-beef-driving-indonesian-shift-imports/> (accessed on 
15-12-2018).   
15Adelaide Knowles “High Price of Beef Driving Indonesian Shift on Imports” < 
http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/high-price-beef-driving-indonesian-shift-imports/> (accessed on 
15-12-2018).   
16 T J D Kight-Jones and J Rushton “The Economic Impacts of Foot and Mouth Disease – What are they are they 
and where do they occur?” (2013) 112(3-4) Prev. Vet. Med. 161 161. 
17 Knight-Jones & Rushton (2013) Prev. Vet. Med. 161. 
8 
 
safety respectively.18 The SPS Agreement, generally speaking, has two major objectives: the 
first being to protect and improve current human health, animal health and the phytosanitary 
situation of all Member countries; and the second: the protection of Members from arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination which can take the form of sanitary and phytosanitary standards or 
measures.19  
2 1  SPS Measures and the Practical Effects They Often Have 
The practical effect which SPS measures have can be grouped into three categories: (1) they 
can, and often do, act as a barrier to trade by imposing an import ban, or by increasing product 
and marketing costs, thereby making it more expensive to trade; (2) they divert trade from one 
trading partner to another by setting regulations that discrimination across potential suppliers; 
and (3) they can have the effect of reducing overall trade flows by increasing costs or raising 
barriers for all potential suppliers.20 Unfortunately, the impacts that SPS measures have has 
mostly been acknowledged and illustrated within a developed country context.21 This is 
unfortunate when we consider the fact that SPS measures are most likely to be a more 
prominent issue for the developing country, and LDC,Members.22 Members have identified 
certain issues and concerns they have in regards to the SPS Agreement, and its implementation. 
The areas of concern raised in the review of the SPS Agreement which shall be examined 
further in this paper relate to two issues. Firstly, the issue which (some) Members have 
expressed regarding Article 3. Article 3 concerns harmonisation of SPS measures around 
international standards. Article 3 does not create an obligation in this regard but is instead 
aimed at encouraging such harmonisation. Secondly, the issues raised in connection to Article 
6 of the SPS Agreement, which creates obligations concerning the adaptation of SPS measures 
to regional conditions. This issue is often referred to as the ‘regionalisation issue’.  
In relation to the issues, which have been raised by Members as well as by academics, 
certain proposals have been put forward in an attempt to address these issues. These proposals 
have taken many forms, such as guidelines, procedures or amendments to the Agreements. If 
these proposals are accepted by the WTO the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) would be able 
to use such in the interpretation of Article 3 and 6. These proposals are useful in that they help 
                                                 
18 J W Kang and D Ramizo “Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers on 
International Trade” (2017) 4 JWT 539 539. 
19 S Henson, R Loader, A Swinbank & M Bredahl “The Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures on 
Developing Country Exports of Agricultural and Food Products” (1999) 3. 
20 Henson et al (1999) 3. 
21 Henson et al (1999) 3. 
22 Henson et al (1999) 3. 
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identify the issues which Members have specific problem with. Whether these proposals which 
have been adopted will in fact have a positive effect on addressing these issues is something 
which must be questioned. It cannot be taken as a given that they will be successful, they need 
to be critical examined as to whether they fall short of making any real change in terms of the 
interpretation of Article 3 and Article 6. Throughout this paper, the focus will mainly be on the 
issues and concerns voiced by developing country Members.  
2 2  The History and Significance of the SPS Agreement 
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) enables Members to 
enact trade measures designed to protect human, animal and plant life and/or health, on the 
condition that such measures do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade.23 The SPS Agreement (and TBT Agreement) gives more substance to 
this general objective and both seek to regulate when such measures can be enacted, how they 
are to be enacted (i.e. processes and procedures required for a measure to be considered legal) 
and how they are to be implemented. SPS and TBT measures have become very significant in 
the context of international trade. Some attribute this growth in significance to factors such as 
increased consumer demand for safe, high-quality goods and growing concerns relating to 
issues of water, air and soil pollution.24 Some have attributed the rise in use of SPS and TBT 
measures to the global decreasing use of tariffs. In a paper presented at The Conference on 
Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda in the WTO 2000 Negotiations Henson et al state that 
with the liberalisation of tariff and quantative restrictions on trade, specifically in agricultural 
and food products, attention has increasingly been placed on technical regulations, labelling 
requirements and quality and compositional standards.25 Debroy is of the view that 
protectionist pressures exist in every country and that the traditional tools for such 
protectionism has always been the use of tariffs. Due to WTO negotiations that have led to 
commitments to reduce the use of tariffs, this protectionism surfaces in the form of (among 
other non-tariff barriers) SPS and TBT measures.26 Henson et al quoted a range of academics27 
                                                 
23 Art XX of the GATT 1994.  
24 A L Stoler “TBT & SPS Measures, in Practice” in J Maur & J Chauffour (eds) Preferential Trade Agreement 
Policies for Development: A Handbook (2011) 217. 
25 Henson et al (1999) 1. 
26 B Debroy “The SPS and TBT Agreements – Implications for Indian Policy” in Indian Council for research on 
International Economic Relations, New Delhi Working Papers 163 (2005) 1. 
27 Petrey & Johnson (1993); Ndayisenga and Kinsey (1994); Thimany and Barret (1997); Hillman (1997); Skyes 
(1995); National Research Council (1995), Unnevehr 1999; Digges et al (1997). 
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when they stated that it is widely acknowledged that SPS measures can act to impede trade in 
agricultural and food products.28  
An illustration of the importance that SPS and TBT measures have come to play in 
international trade was illustrated in the negotiations proceeding Russia’s accession to the 
WTO where the existence of certain Russian SPS measures on US exports of beef and pork 
created an obstacle to their accession.29 Upon accession to the WTO a member state is obligated 
to adhere to the provisions of the SPS Agreement (as well as the TBT Agreement).30 A 
challenging aspect of Russia’s accession into the WTO was reaching an agreement on how it 
would implement the SPS Agreement and bring its regulations and practices into compliance 
with the Agreement.31 Russia had a practice of using rigid SPS requirements for imported 
animal and plant products, which had an adverse effect for US exporters of poultry, pork, dairy 
products, grains and oilseeds.32 A crucial and large part of the negotiations surrounding 
Russia’s accession into the WTO centred around ensuring that Russia would introduce and 
implement laws and resolutions requiring their agencies to follow international SPS 
standards.33  In a Report on Russia’s Implementation of the WTO Agreement, written by the 
Executive Office of the President of the United States in December of 2013, it was stated that 
Russia’s use of SPS measures were of specific concern during the accession negotiations. It 
was stated, rather vaguely, that questions concerning Russia’s application of the SPS 
Agreement and Russia’s specific commitments with regard to its applications of SPS measures 
still remained.34This can be used as illustration as to how SPS and TBT measures are significant 
not only in the context of international trade but furthermore have a practical effect on 
negotiations and policy making within the WTO. 
When the SPS Agreement was entered into force with the Establishment of the WTO it 
was reaffirmed that no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life35. These Agreements (being the SPS 
Agreement and the TBT Agreement) were also introduced with the desire to improve human 
                                                 
28   Henson et al (1999) 3. 
29 S Y Deodhar “WTO Agreements on SPS and TBT: Implications for Food Quality Issues IIM-A Working Paper 
# 2001-04-05” for Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabed, Research and Publication Department (2001) 3 
30 W H Cooper “Russia’s Accession to the WTO and its Implications for the United States” June 2012. 8 
31 W H Cooper “Russia’s Accession to the WTO and its Implications for the United States” June 2012. 8 
32 W H Cooper “Russia’s Accession to the WTO and its Implications for the United States” June 2012. 8 
33 W H Cooper “Russia’s Accession to the WTO and its Implications for the United States” June 2012. 8 
34 USA EXECUTIVE REPORT 
35 Subject to the condition that these measures are not applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same conditions prevail; or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. 
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health, animal health and phytosanitary in all Members. The protection and improvement of 
human, animal and plant life is undoubtedly of importance.  
2 3 Questioning the success of the SPS Agreement 
There are commentators who doubt that the SPS and TBT Agreements are actively 
achieving such objectives. The SPS and TBT Agreements are not universally accepted and 
celebrated, this is true both in an academic sense and a practical sense. Numerous 
commentators have expressed concerns about various aspects of the SPS Agreement. The first 
being Satish Y Deodhar, who holds the view that the SPS and TBT Agreements have not been 
consulted as much as they should be by certain industries and researchers.36 He expresses 
further concern regarding the confusion that exists in the understanding of the difference 
between the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement.37  
The second, which is shared by many, is that governments may (and often do) 
exaggerate the requirements of health and consumer safety and effectively use SPS and TBT 
measures to protect domestic producers or domestic industry from fair competition.38 This does 
not only adversely affect international trade interests, but it also has the potential to restrict the 
choice of goods available to consumers, thereby negatively affecting consumer welfare.39 Kang 
and Ramizo, for example, caution that while the motivations behind the implementation of SPS 
and TBT measures is to ensure the quality and standard of imported goods, these measures are 
often excessive.40 They explain that where these measures are excessive they can depress trade 
flows.41 More concerning, is where these measures are motivated by vested interests of 
domestic businesses or are created to benefit national self-interests they often work against the 
welfare of the people as costs are driven up and both consumers and importers are left unable 
to benefit from cheaper imported products in variety.42 
A third concern raised by Kany and Ramizo is the fact that while SPS and TBT 
measures are rising in significance in our international trading system, due to their increased 
                                                 
36 S Y Deodhar “WTO Agreements on SPS and TBT: Implications for Food Quality Issues IIM-A Working Paper 
# 2001-04-05” for Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabed, Research and Publication Department (2001) 3. 
37 Deodhar (2001) Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabed, Research and Publication Department 13. 
38 J W Kang and D Ramizo “Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers on 
International Trade” (2017) 4 JWT 539 539. 
39 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 539. 
40 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 540. 
41 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 540. 
42 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 540. 
12 
 
use, the impact that they have on trade is not yet well known.43 The economic theory provides 
no straightforward insights on how these measures affect international flows of goods.44 
A further commonly shared concern centres around developing and least developed 
countries and whether SPS and TBT measures and their implementation are working to their 
(unfair) disadvantage. In the conclusion of their paper Kang and Ramizo conclude that the 
positive impact on trade derived from SPS and TBT measures and their implementation are 
mostly derived from ‘advanced economies’, while ‘less developed economies’ gain less or are 
even hurt by such measures.45 They explain that while SPS and TBT measures can be said to 
be contributing to North-North trade, developing countries are largely being excluded from the 
gains.46 They are not alone in this conclusion. Deodhar expresses the view that many provisions 
of the SPS Agreement are written in a manner that favours the Western nations.47 In his paper 
Mayeda sets outs way in which the SPS and TBT Agreements place greater burdens on 
developing countries.48 
Thus, while it is true that SPS measures are of utmost importance in international trade 
and serve very important functions, they were not without their problems. These problems can 
manifest in the interpretation and understanding of the Agreements, as they are difficult to 
understand, interpret and implement. This difficultly leads to problems regarding their practical 
effect on trade and the potential they hold to work to the disadvantage of developing and least 
developing member states.  
3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The first aim of this paper to establish a clear, coherent and accepted interpretation of the 
Article 3 and Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. This will be done using the legal reasoning of 
Reports by the Panel and the Appellate Body that have been adopted by the Dispute Settlement 
Body in addition to the SPS Committee Meeting Reports and academic commentaries on these 
works. While this paper does not purport to establish a new interpretation of the Agreements, 
it seeks to use existing authority to identify the interpretation of the Agreements that have been 
accepted as correct. Once such an interpretation has been established it shall be practically 
                                                 
43 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 541. 
44 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 541. 
45 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 561. 
46 Kang & Ramizo (2017) JWT 561. 
47 S Y Deodhar “WTO Agreements on SPS and TBT: Implications for Food Quality Issues IIM-A Working Paper 
# 2001-04-05” for Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabed, Research and Publication Department (2001) 6. 
48 G Mayeda “Developing Disharmony: The SPS and TBT Agreements and the Impact of Harmonization on 
Developing Countries” (2004) 4 JEL 737 751. 
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applied to the legal questions surrounding Article 3 and Article 6 arising from the above 
discussed dispute between Brazil and Indonesia.49 This dispute has not yet gone to the Panel, 
the interpretation of the Agreements shall be applied to the identified legal issues in order to 
predict the most probable outcome of the dispute, should it go before the Panel. 
Articles 3 and 6 have given rise to disagreements amongst member states regarding the 
rights and obligations to which they give rise. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide 
an overview of the disputed interpretations. The primary sources of information regarding the 
contested views is the Fifth Review of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
which was conducted at a SPS Committee Meeting on the 12 and 13 July 2018 together with 
the relevant Panel and AB Reports dealing with these disputed interpretations.  
The third and final aim is to illustrate how these issues manifest in reality for the 
developing Members of the WTO and to demonstrate that these are not merely academic or 
theoretical problems. Here it is intended to demonstrate that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
has in fact had the opportunity to hand down findings and reports that are alive to the challenges 
that are specific to the developing world and are therefore adjusted accordingly. Here, while a 
rewording of the text so as to accommodate the developing Members’ interests in a more 
effective manner would be the first prize, the likelihood of such is extremely minimal. 
Therefore, this paper shall seek, as its third aim, to demonstrate why it is important that the 
Dispute Settlement Body ensures that the interests of the developing Members are paid enough 
attention and given the necessary thought when making binding findings which impose 
obligations on these Members. 
Here it is important to note that when speaking about the interpretation and application 
of the Agreements in the context of this paper, what is meant is the interpretation and 
application by the Dispute Settlement Body. Furthermore, where there is a reference to 
‘practical effect’ it is not a reference to the practical effects that these Agreements have on 
trade as between members. Assessing the effects and implications for trade that these 
Agreements have is an empirical issue. What is meant, when referring to the ‘practical effects’, 
is what are the legal implications of a certain interpretation of these Agreements, and how such 
interpretations could and will influence the findings of the Dispute Settlement Body. It is 
                                                 
49 49 DS506: Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Bovine Meat (Still in Consultations). 
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important to remember throughout this paper that this is a discussion centring around the legal 
aspects of the interpretation and application of the SPS Agreement.  
The purpose of this discussion is therefore threefold. Firstly to examine and analyse 
reports which have been accepted by the Dispute Settlement Body in order to find accepted 
and working interpretations of the specified Articles of the SPS Agreement. 50Linked to this 
objective, this interpretation (of these specific Articles) shall be applied to the legal questions 
arising in the Indonesia- Bovine Meat dispute where such legal questions involve these specific 
Articles. The second objective is to examine the issues and concerns which Members have 
raised in regard to these specific Articles. Here the paper shall examine what gives rise to these 
issues and concerns. This shall be done by examining their own submissions within Committee 
meetings as well as the arguments they have put forward within the Dispute Settlement 
proceedings. Thirdly, the proposals that have been forward by parties in resolution of these 
issues and concerns shall be examined. The purpose of such being to determine whether these 
proposals, if they were to be accepted and implemented, would have a practical effect on the 
interpretation of these Articles. Thus the third objective seeks to determine whether the 
proposals will have the effect of altering the manner in which these Articles are interpreted and 
applied by the Dispute Settlement Body. In order to illustrate this, it shall be determined 
whether or not, should the proposals be accepted and implemented by Members (and 
accordingly by the DSU) the outcome concerning the Indonesia – Bovine Meat Case’s 
predicted outcome (concerning the specific Articles) as identified in the course of the first 
objective would be any different. 
 
4 The SPS Agreement  
4 1 Breaking Down the Relevant Sections of the SPS Agreement  
Before going further, it is necessary to expressly state that there is a difference in scope of 
application between the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement. As identified above, certain 
commentators have expressed concern over the fact that a lot of confusion still exists as to the 
difference of these two Agreements. As expressed by Dukgeun Ahn, “the jurisdictional 
delineation between the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement is often obscure”.51 In the 
course of this paper only provisions from the SPS Agreement, specifically Article 3 and Article 
                                                 
50 Article 3.1; 3.2; 3.3 and Article 6.1; 6.2; 6.3. 
51 Ahn, Dukgeun. (2001). Comparative Analysis of the SPS and the TBT Agreements 1. 
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6, shall be examined. It is, however, important to note that the issues arising from the SPS 
Agreement and the TBT Agreement often occur together, this has caused some confusion and 
has often led to Members citing both Agreements when raising an issue instead of identifying 
a specific Agreement. This paper does not seek to create a comparison between the two 
Agreements and therefore it is unnecessary to deal with the TBT Agreement further.  
4 2  The Scope of the SPS Agreement  
The WTO website introduces the SPS Agreement by posing the question of how [a Member] 
can ensure their country’s consumers are being supplier with food that is safe to eat, while at 
the same time that health and safety regulations or standards (i.e. SPS measures) are not being 
used as an alternative for protecting domestic producers. It goes on to explain that the SPS 
Agreement deals with the issue of how governments can apply food safety and annual and plant 
health measures (in other words, SPS measures) in compliance with their WTO obligations and 
commitments.  For a more legal understanding of the scope of the SPS Agreement we can turn 
to the text of the Agreement itself.  
Article 1.1 of the SPS sets out the scope of the Agreement:  
“This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or 
indirectly, affect international trade. Such measures shall be developed and applied in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.” 
A sanitary or phytosanitary measure (“SPS” measure) is defined in para 1 of Annex to the SPS 
Agreement:  
Sanitary or phytosanitary measure - Any measure applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or 
disease-causing organisms; 
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages 
or feedstuffs; 
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from 
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests; or 
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests. 
 
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements 
and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; 
testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatments including 
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relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials 
necessary for their survival during transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, 
sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements 
directly related to food safety 
 
In order for the SPS to be applicable it has to be proven that there is an SPS measure, 
which affects international trade. It is the first requirement (i.e. has to be an SPS measure) that 
gives rise to most of the interpretational issues. In this regard and there are a few Reports which 
have had to deal with this issue52 and for the purposes of this discussion the following shall 
suffice regarding the interpretation of “SPS measure”: a SPS measure is a measure which has 
one of three aims. Firstly, the aim of protection of human, plant, or animal life and/or health 
from food-borne risks; or, secondly, a measure which aims at protecting human, plant, or 
animal life and/or health from risks from pests or disease, or thirdly aims to prevent or limit 
other damage from risks from pests.53 SPS measures are specifically applicable to the safety 
measures taken with concern to pests, diseases and food borne illness. The second requirement 
(that the measure affects international trade) is not one which gives rise to much interpretative 
problems, as any measure which has an effect on imports will meet this requirement.54 
Briefly stated, the SPS Agreement applies to all SPS measures of a WTO Member 
which are broadly defined as those measures which affect human, animal or plant life and 
health.55 
 5 Unpacking the Existing Interpretation 
As stated above this paper does not seek to discuss every Article of these Agreements. Instead, 
it has identified certain Articles through which the rest of the discussion shall facilitated. In 
other words, going forth the context of the discussion shall be Article 3 and Article 6. 
6 Unpacking the Existing Interpretation: Article 3 of the SPS Agreement 
The following Articles of the SPS Agreement shall be examined: Art 3.1; 3.2 and 3.3 
(Harmonisation); Article 6.1; 6.2; and 6.3 (Adaption to Regional Conditions); and Article 7 
Transparency. Here it is once again stressed that the fact that the other Articles of the 
                                                 
52 Appellate Body Report. Australia – Apples (2010)  Panel Reports, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products (2006); Panel Reports, US – Poultry (China) (2010). 
53 P Van den Bossche & W Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials 4 ed (2017) 938. 
54 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 941.  
55 Jurgen Kurtz, A Look behind the Mirror: Standardisation, Institutions and the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements, 
30 U.N.S.W.L.J. 504 (2007) 513 
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Agreement are not discussed herein does not mean that they are free from interpretational 
issues or implementation problems. I have selected Articles 3 and 6 as the subject of my 
dissertation because of the concerns that numerous Members of the WTO have expressed 
regarding their proper interpretation and application.  
It is of no surprise that there are differences in SPS measures in different countries. This 
is due to the different factors that regulators consider when adopting SPS measures – to name 
but a few: consumer preferences; industry interests; geographic and climatic conditions; lobby 
efforts etc.56 The difference in SPS measures among countries has been said by some to be an 
inhibitor to international trade, as this difference creates problems in the context of market 
access for exporting countries, as they have to adjust their products to conform to differing SPS 
measures.57 Article 3 of the SPS Agreement seeks to address this issue. It does so by 
encouraging the harmonisation of Members’ SPS measures.  This Article encourages 
harmonisation, it does not place an obligation on Members to harmonise their SPS measures 
because there is no common standard that would enable them to do so. Article 3 gives Members 
three ‘options’ with regard to international standards, each option resulting in its own 
consequences.58 These options are equally available to Members and there are no instances 
where one a Member will be forced to use one of the options and prohibited from making use 
of another.59 The three options are that Members can either base their own SPS measures on 
international standards60; conform their own SPS measures to international standards61; or 
where there is scientific justification to do so a Member may introduce sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures resulting in a higher level of SPS protection than measures based on 
international standards62.  
                                                 
56 P Van den Bossche & W Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials 4 ed (2017) 951. 
57 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 951. 
58 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 952. 
59 Appellate Body Report, EC Hormones (1998), para. 104.  
60 Article 3.1: To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall 
base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where 
they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. 
61Article 3.2: Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed 
to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994. 
62 Article 3.3: Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence 
of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.2 Notwithstanding the above, all measures which 
result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved by measures 
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6 1 Harmonisation according to Article 3.1  
The ‘international standards’ in the Context of Art 3.1 refers to standards that have been set by 
international organisations.63 The Appellate Body in the EC – Hormones case (1998) explained 
that, in order to fall within the scope of Article 3.1 a Member needs only to prove that a national 
standard exists, it does not need to established how such a standard was adopted (i.e. consensus, 
majority vote etc).64 A measure will be found to be based on an international standard where a 
measure is ‘founded’ on, ‘based’ on, or ‘built’ upon an international standard. The measure at 
issue in this case was a prohibition that the EC had enacted on the importation (and placing on 
the market) of meat and meat products treated with certain hormones for growth purposes. This 
dispute was brought to the DSB by the United States. The Panel found that the EC had acted 
inconsistently with Articles 3.1 (as well as with Article 5.1 and 5.5) of the SPS Agreement 
when they enacted the ban on import of meat and meet products from cattle that had been 
treated with certain growth hormones.65 The EC took the matter further, to the Appellate Body. 
The AB agreed that the EC had acted inconsistently with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. It, 
however, reversed the finding that the EC import was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 5.5 of 
the SPS Agreement. 66 
The measure adopted by a Member, to fall under Art 3.1, need not incorporate all the 
elements of an international standard.67 It will suffice if the measure comprises certain elements 
of such international standard and does not contradict the standard.68 The Appellate Body in 
the EC – Hormones (1998) expressly stated that Article 3.1 does not make these international 
standards binding.  
6 2  Harmonisation according to Article 3.2  
Conforming a Member’s SPS measures to international standards, as provided in the option 
given by Art 3.2, is a more onerous task than simply basing SPS measures upon international 
                                                 
based on international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other 
provision of this Agreement. 
63 The three main organisations are: Codex Alimentarius Commission; World Organisation for Animal Health; 
International Plant Protection Convention.  
64 Panel Report, EC-Hormones (Canada) (1998). Para 8.72  
65“European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)”   
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm (accessed on 17-12-2018). 
66“European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)”   
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm (accessed on 17-12-2018). 
67 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones (1998), Para 165. 
68 P Van den Bossche & W Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials 4 ed (2017) 953 
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standards. The distinction between “based on” and “conforming to” is critical. The phrase 
“based on” has been interpreted to mean “stand on”, “founded on”, “built upon”; or “supported 
by”.69 The phrase “conform to” suggests that this option requires a stricter, more rigid test. The 
Appellate Body, in the EC – Hormone (1998) case, has interpreted this to mean that the SPS 
measure has to ‘embody’ the international standard completely, and effectively converts it into 
a municipal standard.70 While SPS measures which conform to international standards are 
presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement this assumption is in fact rebuttable.71 This 
(rebuttable) presumption of consistency exists in order to try provide Members’ with an 
incentive to utilise international standards and/or bring their measures into conformity with 
international standards.72 The distinction, between Article 3.1 and 3.2 is therefore important. 
Where a country’s SPS measures have been conformed to international standards they are less 
open to challenges brought under the SPS Agreement.73 In other words, it would be easier for 
one Member State to challenge the SPS Measures of another Member State if such measures 
are merely “based on” international standards. In the case of such a challenge (i.e. a challenge 
under Art 3.1), the Member State alleging that a SPS measure has not been based on the 
international standard bears the burden of proving such.74 This burden, however, is much less 
of a burden to bear than the burden of proof in terms of a challenge under Art 3.2. This because 
the Member State alleging inconsistency with Article 3.2 will also have to rebut the 
presumption of consistency that is created.75 
6 3 Harmonisation According to Article 3 3 
The third option made available by Art 3.3  allows Member States to depart from international 
standards and enforce a measure which results in a higher level of protection than that which 
is achieved by the applicable international standards.76 This needs to be understood as a right 
of a Member to choose the level of protection which they deem necessary or appropriate in 
their own territories.77 This higher level of protection constitutes a greater obstacle to trade than 
the SPS measures which comply with either Article 3.1 or 3.2.  This right is not an absolute 
right. This was confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones (1998). Here, if a Member 
                                                 
69 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 953. 
70 Appellate Body Report, EC Hormones (1998), para 170. 
71 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 954. 
72 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 954. 
73 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 954 
74Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 953. 
75 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 954. 
76 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 954 
77 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 954 
20 
 
wants to rely on this option, they have to satisfy one of the two conditions: (1) there is scientific 
justification for their higher level protection; or (2) the measure is a result of the level of 
protection chosen by the Member in accordance with Articles 5.1 – 5.8.78 Article 3.3 has been 
criticised and has been described as an Article which “is clearly not a model of clarity in 
drafting and communication”.79 
The SPS provisions relating to harmonisation can be summarised as follows: Members 
are encouraged to participate in a number of international standards-setting organisations 
(Codex Alimentarius the International Office of Epizotics (OIE) and the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC).80 Members are expected to use international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations set out by the above organisations as a basis for their own SPS 
measures, although they are entitled to adopt measures amounting to a higher level of 
protection where there is scientific justification for such.81 While the Agreement does not 
prevent Members from choosing their own level of (SPS) regulatory protection, it does oblige 
Members to use international standards as (at least) a reference point for their own domestic 
regulations.82 By using international standards, when setting domestic standards, the SPS 
Agreement creates a presumption of compliance (with Article 3 of the SPS Agreement).83 
It is not surprising, considering the 151 WTO members that the concept of harmonisation has 
not been perceived or received in the same manner.  
7 Issues with Article 3 of the SPS Agreement 
It is important to remember that the SPS Agreement does not operate in the context of 
international trade law in a vacuum but rather interacts with a number of Agreements, 
Conventions and the like. Thus, very often when academics speak of harmonisation within 
international trade law they do not provide commentary solely on one Agreement or one piece 
of  WTO law, but instead use the framework of international trade law as a whole. Here, we 
shall include these commentaries surrounding harmonisation in our discussion of 
harmonisation as so required by Article 3 of the SPS Agreement.  
                                                 
78 Van den Bossche & Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 955. 
79 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones (1998), para 176.  
80 Spencer Henson, Rupert Loader, Alan Swinbank and Maury Bredahl The Impact of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures on Developing Country Exports of Agricultural and Food Products 6 
81 Henson et al (1999)  6. 
82 Jurgen Kurtz, A Look behind the Mirror: Standardisation, Institutions and the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements, 
30 U.N.S.W.L.J. 504 (2007) 513. 
83 Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement 
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There is not much agreement when it comes to harmonisation. Some argue that valid 
domestic legislative priorities (valid meaning that they are not disguised protectionist 
measures) should be seen as a the legitimate exercise of a State’s sovereignty.84 There is the 
argument that ‘policy diversity’ is important as it promotes ‘competitive governments’.85 
Despite there being such prevalent debate around the possible benefits of harmonisation as well 
as the value of harmonisation, there is an increased drive towards harmonisation in the field of 
international trade law.86  
7 1 What Degree of Harmonisation does the SPS Agreement Envisage? 
Some commentators are of the opinion that the Article 3 has not been correctly applied and 
implemented. They argue that the obligation it creates (the obligation on Members to base their 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations 
where they exist) was intended to be the main provision of the SPS Agreement.87 Their view 
is that the SPS Agreement was adopted and enacted with the objective of achieving more 
harmonisation between Member States’ SPS measures. These commentators argue that there 
needs to be more harmonisation. They contend that the provisions of the Agreement which 
allow for differences in country Members’ SPS measures allow such difference only in 
instances where the difference is a minor difference in international standards; where there is 
scientific justification for a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection; or in instances 
where the relevant international organisation has not recently reviewed the standard at issue 
and in the interim new information has shown that the matter in question may pose a greater 
health risk than the organisations’ standards reflect.88 Their view defines the circumstances 
where differentiation between SPS measures is acceptable very narrowly. It seems that they 
argue that where there are differences (in international standards) which are not caused by their 
narrow list of circumstances, these would be against the ‘mandate’ of the SPS Agreement. 
Accordingly, where they create different SPS standards and measures such should be found to 
be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. 
These commentators argue that the Appellate Body’s finding in the Beef Hormone Case 
weakened the impact (of harmonisation) envisioned by the negotiators of the SPS Agreement. 
                                                 
84 739 
85 739. 
86 738 
87 R Neugebauer Fine-Tuning WTO Jurisprudence and the SPS Agreement: Lessons from the Beef Hormone Case 
(2000) 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1255 1260. 
88 Neugebauer (2000)  Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1259. 
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These commentators are specifically referring to the Appellate Body’s finding in which they 
found that the SPS Agreement, and specifically Article 3.1, does not have the intention to 
transform international standards, guidelines and recommendations into binding norms and 
thus, that Article 3.1 does not require Member States to harmonise their SPS measures by 
conforming those measures with international standards.89 The Appellate Body found that these 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations do not have obligatory force and 
effect.90In support for this argument they cite one commentator who stated:91  
[T]he Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 3.1 ... gutted the mandatory language that 
members "shall base" their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on existing international 
standards.... As a consequence, it would appear that one of the central features of the SPS 
Agreement-the obligation to base SPS measures on existing international standards-has been 
converted into an idealistic but wholly unenforceable objective. 
Regine Neugebauer express the view that this effect is worsened by the Appellate Body’s stated 
view of the relationship between Articles 3.1; 3.2 and 3.3.92 The Appellate Body, in this 
decision, made it clear that these options are equally available to Member States. It also held 
that there is no ‘rule-exception’ relationship between these Articles. This was a significant 
departure from the Panel’s interpretation of these three Articles. The panel expressed its view 
that Article 3.1’s “based on” was intended to mean the same thing as Article 3.2’s “conform 
to”.93. This informed the Panel’s further view that Articles 3.1 and 3.2 were the rule (or the 
‘mandate’), while Article 3.3 provided an exception to such rule. Neugebauer expresses 
dissatisfaction with the fact that the Appellate Body accorded equal weight to the two mandates 
(found in Article 3) and the finding that these mandates apply in different circumstances.94 
Neugebauer expresses hope that a future Panel (or Appellate Body) will interpret Article 3 as 
strictly as possible.95 In other words, his hope is that the Panel, and the Appellate Body, will, 
in the future, interpret Article 3 in such a way that it creates a stronger obligation on the 
Member States to harmonise their SPS measures with international standards. This would, in 
his opinion, have the effect of reducing divergence amongst Member States’ SPS measures, 
and thus reduce obstacles to trade. Neugebauer also seems to take issue with the fact that the 
                                                 
89 EC-Hormones (1998) para 165. 
90 EC-Hormones (1998) para 165. 
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Appellate Body found that Article 3.3 requires measures not based on international standards 
to require scientific justification and compliance with Article 5.96 This issue is not elaborated 
on much further in his commentaries.  
In criticising the Appellate Body in the Beef Hormone97 dispute Neugebauer expressed 
the view that it was “short-sighted and unfortunate” to not make a strong statement explaining 
that SPS measures must be “based on scientific principles” and “not maintained without 
scientific evidence”, regardless of the existence or nature of any risk assessment performed.98  
Neugebauer, quite dramatically,  states that the ‘creators’ of the SPS Agreement 
intended to impose a serious obligation on Member countries to base their SPS measures on 
international standards, but that the Appellate Bodies findings reduced this effort to stimulate 
harmonisation (on the part of the negotiators) to “little more than wishful thinking”.99 In the 
course of this argument Neugebauer contends that the Appellate Body should have upheld the 
Panel’s finding in regards to the ‘rule-exception relationship’ between Article 3.1 and Article 
3.3.He further contends that the Panel’s interpretation of the phrase “based on” in Article 3.1 
should have been endorsed by the Appellate Body. The authors argue that while the Appellate 
Body explained its interpretation of “based on” as a less-than-identical relationship between a 
measure and a standard, they hope to see further Panels translate this general guideline into 
‘hard numbers’.100 These authors contend that the current position, created by the Appellate 
Body’s decision, leaves Member States lacking guidance.101 They argue that the guidelines 
given by the Appellate Body should be translated into actual tangible rules and standards. They 
advocate for, in such translation, the inclusion of cut-off levels, which would determine when 
divergence is minor enough to leave the “based on” holding intact, and when it (the divergence) 
has become too great to find that a measure was “based on” the standard.102 Simply put, they 
call for two ‘levels’ of divergence to be created, one level which can be regarded as minor and 
thus relatively inconsequential, and another level, which would be regarded as significant 
enough to find that there has been a departure from the international standard.  They argue that 
the inclusion of such cut off levels will leave a “vast grey area in between” and thus there will 
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be “ample room for case-by-case determinations”.103 It is clear that Neugebauer advocates for 
harmonisation, specifically in the context of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, she 
seems to call for strict harmonisation, without much room for flexibility.   
7 2  Harmonisation and Development 
Graham Mayeda provides another line of commentary relevant to this discussion. He explains 
that he is of the view that harmonisation is an ineffective tool for dealing with development 
issues.104 He explains that there are two main debates regarding harmonising domestic 
regulatory policies: Firstly, the debate between advocates of trade liberalisation and consumer 
and environmental groups.105 Here the argument surrounds possible impediments to (free) trade 
versus the restriction on political sovereignty enjoyed over domestic regulatory standards in 
areas such as environmental protection and food health and safety.106 The second debate exists 
between developed countries and developing (least developed) countries. Developed countries 
express concern that harmonisation will force them to adopt lower standards, while developing 
countries express concern that the higher standards of developed countries will act as barriers 
to developed countries markets.107 There are also concerns in developed countries that they 
might have to give up their higher labour and environmental standards in order to compete with 
developing countries, while developing countries fear that harmonisation will force them out 
of their sources of comparative advantage.108 One needs to remember that within this 
discussion, for Developing Country Members this issue of harmonisation of the SPS measures 
(within the context of Article 3) is only one aspect of the numerous challenges they face in 
carrying out their WTO obligations.109 
When considering whether harmonisation is in fact beneficial, especially for 
developing countries, the following arguments in favour of harmonisation are often brought. It 
has been argued that harmonisation of international standards provides efficiency gains, as 
exporters will only have to adapt a single international standard, instead of a multiplicity of 
standards.110 It is further contended that harmonisation can ensure that jurisdictions internalise 
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the cost of the externalities that result from policy differences.111 Some further argue that 
economies of scale can be realised through harmonised standards as manufacturers and service 
providers will be able to distribute their goods and services more readily beyond their own 
domestic markets when standards are harmonised.112 There is of course also the benefit of 
transparency, as if standards are harmonised the difficulty of determining whether domestic 
standards are disguised trade barriers or legitimate regulatory initiatives.113 
7 2 1 Developing Countries and Harmonisation 
One, however, needs to stop and consider the possible issues which arise for developing 
countries in the context of institutional capacity and the costs which would be imposed on them 
by the demands of trade harmonisation.114 The issues centred on developing country Members 
and capacity under the SPS Agreement have long been and continue to be an issue.115 In this 
regard developing country Members have struggled to find a balance between limitations in 
their ability and capacity to implement their obligations under the SPS Agreement and the 
necessity for the protection of public health.116 The Agreement itself only requires a limited 
level of institutional capacity to be provided. This takes the form of enquiry points to deal with 
enquiries regarding adopted standards.117 These costs, however, are just the beginning. The 
implementation costs arising from harmonised standards involve more than merely adopting 
legislation, they involve the creation of the necessary infrastructure and development of 
institutions that enable exporters from developing countries to meet the applicable international 
standard.118 A further cost of compliance is the reoccurring cost of maintained of (regular) 
surveillance and testing programs as well as certain non-reoccurring costs such as development 
of laboratory infrastructure and processing facilities.119 Some question whether this 
cumbersome institutional investment is the cost of engaging in the global economy? Or can 
developing countries invest in other areas or sectors instead? While this question is indeed an 
interesting one and could help facilitate the discussion regarding harmonisation of standards it 
is not the purpose of this paper to find an answer to this question.  
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The SPS Agreement itself seems to deal with the issue of institutional investment as a 
responsibility (and thus burden) of the individual WTO Member.120 Article 9.1 does, however, 
demonstrate a consensus amongst the developed country Members, to “facilitate the provision 
of technical assistance” especially to Developing Country Members.121 Article 9.2 further 
recognises that ‘substantial investments’ might be required for an exporting developing country 
to meet SPS measures. This Article, however, merely creates a non-binding obligation to 
“consider providing technical assistance” in these cases. There is a huge imbalance between 
the cumbersome institutional commitments that the SPS Agreement requires from developing 
countries and the largely non-binding commitments to provide such countries with technical 
assistance.122 Thus while the Agreement seems to understand that there are great cost 
implications for Developing Country Members it does little to help these Developing Members 
to carry this burden in practice.    
In the specific context of the SPS Agreement, Mayeda explains that harmonisation has 
been one of the key motivating factors for the Agreement.123 Here he questions, when 
considering that most of the disputes surrounding the SPS Agreement and SPS measures have 
involved developed countries, how the trend towards the harmonisation of SPS measures has 
served developing countries.124 Mayeda also explains that the SPS Agreement has the 
possibility of supporting both policy convergence and policy divergence.125 He explains that 
judicial interpretation of these Agreements recognises the prerogative of Members to determine  
the acceptable level of risk for their domestic environment while, on the other hand, the 
promotion of international standards seems to encourage harmonisation.126 Without discussing 
this issue in depth it can be said that the SPS Agreement does allow for some flexibility within 
the regime, to make allowance for the recognition of developing countries’ differing 
capacities.127 This flexibility’s significance, has, however, been called into question after the 
Appellate Body’s Decision in Japan - Apples128.129 In this case the United States alleged that 
Japan’s barietal testing requirement, which had the effect of prohibiting the import of certain 
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plants due to their potential as hosts of the coding moths, was inconsistent with Japan’s 
obligations under the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body found in favour of the United States 
on the basis of their finding that Japan’s measure was inconsistent with Article 5.1.130 This 
Appellate Body has been interpreted to have had the effect of taking away a significant 
discretion on the part of the regulating country to implement SPS measures based on its own 
scientific assessment.131 A certain degree of flexibility is still possible, however, as long as 
international standards are set broadly enough to recognise differences existing between 
different Member States, and as long as standard setting bodies ensure that developed countries 
participate in the process of setting these standards.132 
While it is true that harmonisation of SPS standards would reduce compliance costs of 
developing countries by reducing the number of standards with which developing countries 
would have to comply, the practical reality is that harmonisation has the potential to place 
disproportionate burdens on developing countries.133 This is done in the following ways: firstly, 
most standards, other than those set by international bodies, are set by developed nations. This 
means that developing countries are made to comply with standards as set by industrialised 
countries.134 Second, international standards are primarily set by developed countries.135 The 
SPS Agreement relies to a large extent on international standards and, thus by extension, on 
the international bodies setting such standards.136 The representational make-up of bodies 
which are tasked with setting these standards tend to oversee, ignore or exclude the interests of 
developing countries.137 It is crucial for developing countries to take part in the setting of 
international standards in order to ensure that their specific needs and special circumstances 
are taken into account.138 Thirdly, compliance with SPS (and TBT) measures necessarily 
entails a cost to the exporting nation, this has a disparate impact on developing countries.139 
This impact is further worsened by the fact that most developing countries lack adequate 
institutional framework or financial resources at their disposal to monitor and access 
compliance.140 Fourth, and finally: the cost and technical capacity required to demonstrate the 
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equivalence of domestic standards set by developing countries to those of importing nations.141 
These costs take various forms: the costs incurred through participation in international 
standard setting bodies; the costs of improving the capacity of developing countries to 
participate in international standard-setting; costs of developing domestic risk-assessment 
capacity; as well as the costs that come with challenging SPS measures set by developed 
countries that represent standards higher than those set by international bodies and the costs of 
using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.142 Finger and Schuler summarise some of the 
costs arising from compliance programmes undertaken by the World Bank between 1980 and 
2000: the range of the costs incurred was USD 3.3 million spent in Turkey for the 
modernisation of laboratories in Turkey for the purpose of residue control to USD 108 million 
for a disease control project for livestock in Brazil.143 Argentina spent over USD 80 million in 
an effort to improve levels of plant and animal sanitation for the purpose of improving the level 
of export acceptance.144 These costs were incurred by these Member States in an effort to 
enable them to be able to harmonise their SPS standards with international standards. In order 
be able to harmonise their standards with the international standards they had upgrade their 
infrastructure, this is a costly exercise. While I do not contend that these countries will not draw 
benefits from these efforts to harmonise, I aim to point out that the cost to harmonisation might 
act as hindrance to certain developing Member States and especially to LDC Member States. 
If there is going to be an instance that a stronger obligation to harmonise is enforced, they need 
to show that they are alive to the obstacles that a lot of the Member States will face. I argue 
that they need to go further than merely demonstrating that they are alive to such. I argue that 
should offer practical solutions and means to overcome these obstacles. I am not questioning 
whether harmonisation of SPS measures across the globe will be beneficial to trade. What I am 
arguing is that harmonisation across the globe faces many challenges. One challenge surrounds 
the question of what exactly Member States should be using to harmonise their standards and 
measures. Here the answer given seems to be international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations. Harmonisation would only be effective and beneficial to all WTO Member 
States if they all participate in setting these international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations. A second glaring challenge is the cost of harmonisation. This cost manifests 
in infrastructure; know-how; technology and capacity. A lot of the WTO Members are in fact 
                                                 
141 Mayeda (2004) JIEL 752.  
142 Mayeda (2004) JIEL 752 
143 Mayeda (2004) JIEL 753. 
144 Mayeda (2004) JIEL 753. 
29 
 
developing countries and many are LDCs. Some of these Members are not in a position to be 
able to carry these costs. For effective and fair harmonisation to be released, commitments to 
provide aid need to be given. 
7 2 2 Effective Participation in Negotiations and Harmonisation 
A number of developing countries have raised concerns about their ability to effectively 
participate in negotiations on the SPS Agreement and have any real influence on it’s the 
outcomes of such negotiations, this results in them having an inconsequential influence on its 
interpretation, application and implementation by both the DSB and other WTO Members.145 
These countries are not concerned with attending SPS Committee meetings or meetings of the 
international organisations which set international standards but rather with their ability and 
capacity to understand and contribute to the discussions which take place within these 
organisations and committees.146 In this context technical and scientific know-how is a major 
constraint for developing countries.147 Lack of (effective) participation in the SPS Agreement 
leads to concerns of an inability of developing country member to benefit from the 
Agreement.148 While at face value these countries are able to participate in the discussions, 
negotiations and drafting of the SPS Agreement this does not translate to an ability to 
participate in the Agreement. This is because their participation is extremely limited, mostly 
by their lack of technical and scientific know-how. Their participation is not able to yield them 
any real influence, accordingly they find themselves unable to voice their specific concerns or 
enact any real change.  This is an obvious concern, as a lack of an ability to effectively 
participate in the Agreement results in the workings of the Agreement149 being driven towards 
the priorities held by developed country Members.150 An illustration of what can happen when 
developing countries are not represented in the bodies which set international standards is what 
happened when the Codex Alimentarius Commission tried to developed a standard for 
couscous. In this process couscous was defined as a product made exclusively from wheat 
despite the fact that in sub-Saharan Africa couscous is made from other crops.151 If such 
standard had in fact been accepted and implemented by importing countries it would have had 
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disastrous effects on exports of couscous made by some of the poorest countries in the world.152 
The definition was altered in this case at a later stage all thanks to the intervention of a single 
representative from sub-Saharan Africa.153 It is thus evident that more attention needs to be 
paid to the internal deliberative process of particular international standardisation bodies.154 
This is even more true when one considers that the SPS Agreement has accorded a significant 
degree of weight to the work of outside organisations, which do not operate on the same basis 
of consensus as the WTO does and often operate in such a manner that marginalises and 
excludes the interests of Developing Country Members.155 
The solution to the problem of participation is, unfortunately, not as straightforward as 
one would think. While amendments to formal rules and processes regarding participation will 
not affect some of the more practical barriers to participation by poorer countries such as the 
cost of transportation, language and expertise.156 Some developed country Members have 
shown that they are alive to this challenge faced by developing country members and in an 
effort to provide aid for their developing counterparts a few of them have donated financial 
resources to this cause.  The Japanese Government donated USD 49 470.00 to the Standards 
and Trade Development Facility (STDF) (2015); The German Government donated EUR 15 
000.00 to the STDF, with the specific objective of helping developing countries and least 
developed countries establish and implemented SPS standards and expand their ability to gain 
or maintain access to international markets (2015). The US donated USD 300 000.00 to the 
STDF, which were to be allocated to help developing countries comply with international SPS 
measures and to gain access to markets (2015). Ireland donated EUR 350 000.00 to technical 
assistance programmes for developing countries, with the general aim of helping developing 
countries play a more active role in the multilateral trading system (2015). Sweden pledged to 
donate SEK 40 million to the STDF during the period of 2015 – 2018 with the aim of helping 
developed countries comply with international SPS standards and as a result gain access to 
more international markets.   However, it can be noted that most of these donations were made 
in 2015 and it seems that the enthusiasm to help the developing countries has seen a slowdown. 
This is hardly surprising in the current global climate we see today, with the rise of policies 
such as Trump’s Administration’s “America First”. 
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In essence: it is clear, that in many cases developing countries lack the capacity to 
contributing international standards.  This lack of capacity can (and does) result in an under-
representation in international standard-setting bodes.157 This can call the legitimacy of the 
standards set by such bodies into question.158 The rules applied globally need to be perceived 
as being fair in both application and outcome. A way in which the WTO has attempted to 
achieve this perception is to adopt a consensus-based approached when adopting new laws, 
rules, regulations and the like. In this context, the legitimacy of the standards can be called into 
question on two fronts. Firstly, where there is a drive to use international standards the task of 
setting these standards is allocated outside of the WTO, this means that the consensus-based 
approach to the setting of new rules, laws and standards is not applied to the setting of these 
standards. Secondly, the representation of developing countries (and LDCs) in the bodies 
which set these international standards is severely lacking. Thus, the standards they set will 
inherently lack insight into the specific circumstances and challenges that the developing 
Member States face. The standards are only being set by the Developed Member States but are 
expected to be adapted by the Developing Member States and LDC Member States. The 
legitimacy of this expectation is questionable. Adding to this is the fact that there is not set 
procedure on how these bodies set international standards. The lack of transparency adds to 
questions surrounding these standards’ already questionable legitimacy. 
It is clear that the obligation, which has been created in Article 3, to base a regulatory 
standard on an internationally harmonised benchmark (where such benchmark) exists is of 
particular concern to the developing country members.159  
7 3 Harmonisation of Rules vs Harmonisation of Standards 
There is the further issue of whether rules or standards is best for the developing country 
Members to adopt. Rules are more rigid and severe. While standards provide a certain level of 
flexibility. Put differently, on the one hand an application of a rule to certain facts decides the 
issue at hand. On the other hand, standards are used to guide a decision-maker in his or her 
determination and provide such decision maker with a framework in which he or she is to 
consider the relevant factors. Kevin E. Davis articulates the difference between rules and 
standards quite elegantly when he explains that in his view rules (a definition of conduct) 
restrict the role of the adjudicator (or decision maker) to simply applying the permissible rules 
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of conduct to the facts of a case before him or her. This is in contrast to the role that the 
adjudicator has when applying standards. This is due to the fact that standards leave the 
specification of the permissible conduct and the application of such to the facts up to the 
adjudicator.160 A very simple example is given by Kaplow:  
“A rule [would] prohibit “driving in excess of 55 miles per hour on expressways” … 
[while] a standard [would] prohibit “driving at an excessive speed on expressway”.”161 
 This is an important decision and developing countries should carefully analyse the difference 
between these standards and rules and determine which would be more advantageous for their 
interests within the context of development and harmonisation. There is some room for debate 
regarding whether developing countries should adopt (bright line) rules rather than standards 
(that lend themselves to interpretation by adjudicators).162 Here Mayeda suggests that when 
recognising the contextual nature of law, one should favour the adoption of standards instead 
of rules. Posner, on the other hand, advocates for developing countries to adopt rules, for two 
reasons. Firstly, rules are easier to apply, which ultimately means that using rules is cheaper 
and more likely to be accurate in their application.163 This is because of the fact that the 
adjudicator/decision-maker’s role is limited to merely applying the given rule to the facts of 
the matter. Secondly, when rules are used it becomes easier to monitor judges and thus the 
likelihood of bribery as well as the influence of politics in the judicial process is reduced.164 
Hay et al add that another benefit of using rules instead of standards is that rules can 
immediately be used by courts as well as private parties. In contrast to standards which often 
require complex forms of legal regulation which require a shift in legal and political culture 
before they can be effectively put in place.165 This view is not free from criticism. Davies argues 
that small jurisdictions should rather prefer standards, explaining that determining an 
appropriate set of rules that correspond to the specific requirements of the domestic situation 
in any given developing countries will involve significant fixed costs, resulting from research 
and communication costs.166 Mayeda explains that the adoption of standards will be better for 
developing countries on the basis of institutional capacity.167 This is because the costs of 
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developing a highly specific rule based regulatory system (in terms of financial recourses and 
economic and legal expertise) is a big burden for developing countries.168 He therefore explains 
that it would make sense for international bodies to adopt standards instead of rules when 
considering the harmonisation of legal standards in the area of SPS measures, as such would 
require less investment from developing countries for evaluating the suitability of the 
regulations for their domestic context.169 Put differently adopting standards would lower the 
costs necessary to ensure participation of developing countries in international standard 
setting.170 Lastly, in this regard, the legitimacy of international regulations will be increased 
where they are broad enough to accommodate the different domestic needs of developed and 
developing countries.171   
8 Developing an accepted interpretation: Article 6 of the SPS Agreement 
Article 6 creates obligations upon Members within the context of the issue of regionalisation. 
More specifically the obligation to adapt SPS measures to regional conditions.172 This 
obligation has also been worded as the obligation to adapt SPS measures to SPS characteristics 
of the area from which the product originated and to which the product is destined.173 This 
obligation exists due to the fact that sanitary and phytosanitary conditions (more specifically 
pest and disease prevalence) are independent of territorial boundaries and thus will differ within 
a country.174 These differences exists due to variations in climate, environment, geographic 
conditions and the regulatory systems in place to control or eradicate pests or diseases within 
a country’s borders.175 It is therefore desirable for SPS measures to be adapted to the conditions 
which exist in the region of origin of the product, where such adaptation is not done it can 
constitute a severe obstacle to trade.176Members have been further encouraged to recognise the 
concepts of pest-or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence.177 Article 6 
places a burden on exporting Members to provide evidence to demonstrate a claim that 
areas/regions within their territories are compliant with this concept.178   
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Article 6.1 creates the general obligation on Members to ensure that their SPS measures 
are adapted according to the SPS characteristics of both the region of origin and the 
destination179, while Article 6.2 concerns the obligation to recognise the concept of pest – or 
disease- free areas, and areas of low pest – or disease- prevalence180. The Appellate Body has 
expressed that Members have a “degree of latitude” in the determination of how to ensure the 
adaption (of SPS measures) required by Article 6.1, or how to implement the recognition of 
pest – or disease-free areas and areas of low prevalence as so required by Article 6.2.181 Article 
6.3 is applicable specifically when an exporting Member Country asserts that an area or zone 
within its territory is pest-or disease free or an area if low pest or disease prevalence.182 
 Article 6 is often recognised as a set of regionalisation requirements which attempt to 
respond to the need to minimise the negative effects that SPS measures can have183 by requiring 
Members to adapt their SPS measures to regional SPS characteristics.184 What is meant by SPS 
characteristics is the level of prevalence of  specific diseases or pests, the existence of 
eradication or control programs and the appropriate criteria or guidelines which may be 
developed by the relevant international organisations.185 Thus, where Article 6 is implemented 
properly and fairly it can have the effect of facilitating trade.  
Article 6 can be said to face two conflicting interests: exporting Members’ interest in 
having a mechanism to ensure that their exports are not unduly affected by an outbreak of 
diseases/pests and the interests of Members in implementing sufficient SPS measures 
necessary to prevent entry, establishment, or spread of pests or diseases.186 It is critical that 
institutions, especially the WTO Dispute Settlement Body find a balance between these two 
interests. If, on the one hand, too strong a mechanism is given to exporting Members, importing 
Members will be forced to face unreasonably high risks of having unwanted pests or diseases 
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spread within their territory.187 While on the other hand, if the mechanism is too strong, in 
favour of the importing Members, they would be able to impose nationwide measures which 
are unnecessary and hinder the export of goods which have a zero SPS risk.188  
Until quite recently the legal issues surrounding Article 6 had not been brought before 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The first panels which have provided legal analyses of 
Article 6 were those in the India – Agricultural Products189 dispute; US – Animals 190dispute; 
and Russia – Pigs (EU)191. Only the India – Agricultural Products dispute and the Russia – 
Pigs (EU) went before the Appellate Body.192 There is currently the Brazil-Indonesia dispute 
(regarding the prohibition on the importation of bovine meat). This dispute is still in the 
consultations phase, however, should these consultations fail this will only be the fourth dispute 
which risings the issue of regionalisation (Article 6) before the Panel. 
8 1  Interpretation found in the India – Agricultural Products (2015) dispute 
In India – Agricultural Products (2015) the US had claimed that India’s measures operated to 
explicitly ban poultry from all parts of a country in which Avian Influenza (AI) was detected 
anywhere in that country.  
The United States argued that this precluded the application of AI restrictions on a 
regionalised basis as provided for in the Terrestrial Code (which contained the relevant 
international standard applicable in the context of AI) and as required by Article 6.1 of the SPS 
Agreement.193 In other words, the US argued that these measures were inconsistent with India’s 
Article 6.1 and 6.2 obligations due to the fact that (a) India had failed to adapt their SPS 
measure to the regional conditions, and (b) had failed to recognise disease (IA) free areas/zones 
or areas/zones of low disease (IA) prevalence. India, on the other hand, argued that the OIE’s 
Terrestrial Code together with Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement allowed importing country 
Members to decide whether or not to recognise disease free areas/or areas of low disease 
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prevalence, based on factors such as the level of prevalence of a specific pest or disease, and 
the relevance of such areas. 194 
The Panel found in favour of the US, and held that India’s AI measures failed to recognise 
the concepts of disease-free areas and areas of low disease prevalence and further were not 
adapted to the SPS characteristics of these areas. Accordingly, the Panel found that India were 
in fact in breach of Article 6.1 and Article 6.2.195 India appealed against the Panel’s 
understanding of the relationship between Article 6.1 and Article 6.3.196 
The Appellate Body considered not only the text, but also the structure and content of 
Article 6, including the relationship between each provision.197 In the context of Article 6.1 the 
Appellate Body noted, firstly, that the first sentence refers to the requirement to ‘adapt’ SPS 
measures to certain regional conditions and imposes a specific obligation on Members to ensure 
that their SPS measures are ‘adapted’ to the ‘sanitary or phytosanitary characteristics’ of the 
areas from which the product is originated and to which the product is destined.198 Here the 
Appellate Body clarified that the a Member’s obligation (to ensure adaptation) applies 
generally and in connection with each specific SPS measure maintained by each Member.199 
The Appellate Body noted , in terms of ‘adaptation’ as required by Article 6.1 (first sentence), 
the fact that Article 6 does not specific a particular or specific manner in which a Member is to 
ensure adaptation of its SPS measures.200 The Appellate Body also noted that Article 6.1 
specifies the non-exhaustive elements that Members must take into account when assessing the 
SPS characteristics of a region.201 Article 6.1 therefore contains the basic obligation of regional 
adaption, delimits it geographically, covers SPS measures generally as well as specifically, and 
non-exhaustively states the considerations for assessing the SPS characteristics of relevant 
areas.202 The Appellate Body importantly clarified pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low 
pest or disease prevalence (which are addressed in Article 6.2 and 6.3) are ‘subsets of all the 
SPS characteristics of an area’ that needs to be considered under Article 6.1.203 The Appellate 
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Body explained that Article 6.3 is one possible manner in which a Member can ensure its 
compliance with Article 6.1.204 The Appellate Body further noted that where a SPS measure, 
or SPS regulatory scheme, explicitly forecloses the possibility of the recognition of the 
concepts of a pest- or disease-free area and areas of low pest or disease prevalence in cases 
where these concepts are relevant to the specific disease addressed by the SPS measure at 
question, then this SPS measure will be inconsistent with Article 6.2.205 
8 2  Interpretation found in the Russia – Pigs (EU) Dispute 
In Russia – Pigs (EU) the dispute concerned certain SPS measures imposed by Russia on 
imports of pigs, pork and other pig products from the EU as a result of African swine fever 
(ASF) outbreaks within the EU. Russia had reacted to such outbreaks by imposing an EU-wide 
import ban, as well as individual import bans in respect of pig, pork and other pig products 
from 4 EU member states.206 The EU challenged both these bans, one of the challenges being 
that they were inconsistent with Articles 6.1; 6.2; and 6.3. The Appellate Body explains that 
the relevant regional SPS characteristics are the specific risk as to the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of pests or diseases at issue within the territory of an importing Member 
and the associated potential biological and economic consequences.207 If the SPS 
characteristics in question are relevant to the existence of  pest- or disease-free areas and areas 
of low pest or disease prevalence, an importing Member will have to (as part of its assessment 
of the SPS characteristics) make a determination as to the pest/disease status of the given area 
pursuant to Article 6.2.208 
In regards to Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement the Appellate Body, in the India – 
Agricultural Product [2015] dispute confirmed that “pest- or disease-free areas” as well as 
“areas of low pest or disease prevalence” are a subset of all the SPS characteristics of an 
area/region that may call for the adaptation of an SPS measure.209 This is significant as it means 
that “pest- or disease-free areas” and “areas of low pest or disease prevalence” are not 
exhaustive of the SPS characteristics of an area/region that may require the adaptation of an 
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SPS measure.210 The first sentence of Article 6.2 creates the obligation on WTO Members to 
recognise the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, 
while the second sentences provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that the determination of 
such areas must be based on.211 These factors include: geography; ecosystems; epidemiological 
surveillance; and the effectiveness of SPS controls.212 There are some commentators that have 
raised the issue that wording of Article 6.2 is ambiguous in terms of its duration and actions 
required thereby.213  
The Appellate Body’s findings, in the Russia – Pigs (EU) dispute, offers some clarity in 
this regard. Firstly, it rejected the notion that Article 6.2 merely requires an acknowledgment 
of the concept of regionalisation in the form of ‘abstract ideas’ and in doing so imposes a less 
stringent obligation than Article 6.1.214 When providing its interpretation of Article 6.2 the 
Appellate Body started off with 2 premises: firstly, the obligation to recognise the concepts of 
pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence is part of the overarching 
obligation to ensure adaptation of SPS measures (as prescribed by Article 6.1) as an ongoing 
obligation; and secondly: the obligation created by Article 6.2 must be interpreted in light of 
the fact that Article 6.3 envisages that exporting Members may make the claims that areas 
within their territories are pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence.215 With these two points in mind the Appellate Body held that the obligation 
created by Article 6.2 requires the importing Member to provide the exporting Member with 
an “effective opportunity” to make such claim and, by doing so, render the concepts of pest- 
or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence operational.216 The Appellate 
Body also explained that the circumstances of the case and the particular instrument at issue 
will (or should) be the panel’s focus (when hearing a dispute surrounding Article 6 of the SPS 
Agreement).217 While this has indeed provided clarification on Article 6.2 there are still some 
unanswered questions: such as what would constitute an ‘effective opportunity’ for the 
exporting Member to make the required claim?218 This question is important in practice, as if 
one fails to provide an effective opportunity it would amount to a failure to comply with the 
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obligation created in Article 6.2. While the Appellate Body failed to answer what exactly 
constitutes an effective opportunity it did explain that the following elements, of the SPS 
measure at hand, were insufficient to constitute an ‘effective opportunity’: (1) the fact that the 
relevant legislation included the definition of ‘regionalization’; and (2) the fact that the relevant 
regulation made a general reference to Chapter 4.3 of the Terrestrial Code (an international 
standard relevant to the SPS measure at hand).219 The Appellate Body further rejected the 
consideration that the regulation stipulated the permission of import form areas free of ASF 
and a relevant condition to recognise a given areas as free of ASF as an ‘effective opportunity” 
in this regard.220 
8 3  Interpretation of Article 6.3 
Finally, in regards to Article 6.3, the Appellate Body found that this Article specifies what must 
be demonstrated by a Member which seeks recognition of a specific area within its territory as 
a pest- or disease-free area (or an area of low pest or disease prevalence).221 Put differently, 
while Article 6.1 and 6.2 sets out the requirements that importing Members have to meet to 
ensure compliance, Article 6.3 creates the obligations that exporting Members have in this 
regard.222 The first sentence of Article 6.3 explains that exporting Members claiming the 
existence of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence within their 
territories must provide the evidence necessary to objectively demonstrate that the specified 
areas are, and will remain, pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence.223 The second sentence of Article 6.3 creates the obligation on exporting Members 
to give reasonable access to the importing Member for inspection, testing and any other 
relevant procedures.224 The Appellate Body, in Russia – Pigs (EU) provides some answers to 
the question of what kinds of evidence an exporting Member needs to provide: “particularized 
evidence with respect to the pest or disease and the area concerned”225; which is ‘sufficient to 
enable the importing Member ultimately to make an objective “determination” … within the 
meaning of the second sentence of Article 6.2’226.227 It is therefore clear that generic 
information or unsubstantiated assertions would not be enough to comply with this 
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obligation.228 The Appellate Body found that, based on the inclusion of the word ‘necessary’, 
exporting Members cannot be expected to provide evidence that is excessive or not relevant to 
a determination (by the importing Member) in this regard.229 It is important for the exporting 
Member to remember that it has to prove that area/region at issue is a PDFAs or ALPDPs not 
only at the point of time in question but are likely to remain so.230 An illustration of the 
significance of this can be found in the Russia – Pigs (EU) dispute: here the EU had established 
protection and surveillance zones along with implementing protective measures upon the first 
outbreak of ASF in Latvia, however, within a month new outbreaks outside the designated 
buffered or infected areas in Latvia were reported.231 The Panel found (this finding was not 
appealed in front of the Appellate Body) that the EU had failed to provide evidence relating to 
“the implementation or modification of control measures following the first outbreak in the 
territory at issue”232.233 The Panel concluded, based on the failure to provide this evidence, that 
the EU had not provided the evidence necessary to objectively demonstrate that the areas at 
issue were likely to remain free of ASF.234  
8 4  The Relationship between the Article 6.1; 6.2; and 6.3  
As to the relationship between the three provisions the Appellate Body noted that it is its 
understanding that the main and overarching obligation of Article 6 is for Members to ensure 
that their SPS measures are adapted to regional SPS characteristics, as set out in Article 6.1.235 
The Appellate Body held that the remainder of Article 6 operates so as to elaborate on certain 
specific aspects of this obligation, as well as the respective duties that apply to importing and 
exporting Members in connection with this.236 The Panel, in US – Animals explained that 
“Article 6 contemplates an interaction in good faith between the two Members, ultimately 
aimed at the ‘adaptation’ of a measure under Article 6.1)”237 It is important that this main 
objective behind these provisions is not lost in the language of adjudication and that Members 
do not lose sight of the fact that Article 6 (along with its corresponding guidelines) is there to 
facilitate trade between each other. Another important aspect of the relationship between the 
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three provisions is the fact that the Appellate Body has specifically and clearly stated that ‘the 
obligations in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 are not triggered by an invocation of Article 6.3”.238 This 
aspect of the relationship between the different provisions of Article 6 is important when one 
is asked to make a determination as to whether a Member Country’s SPS measures are 
consistent with Article 6.  
8 5 Characteristics of the Regional Adaptation Obligation 
Upon reading the Appellate Body report from the India – Agricultural Products dispute one 
can identify at least three important characteristics of the this regional adaptation obligation: 
(1) The obligation a Member Country to ensure adaptation of their SPS Measures in accordance 
with Article 6.1 is an ongoing continuing obligation; (2) Member Countries’ freedom in its 
implementation; and (3) its case-specific nature.239 These three characteristics shall be further 
examined as they are useful to understand when attempting to interpreted this specific 
obligation in the course of its application.  
The Appellate Body found the obligation created by Article 6.1  is not static, but rather 
ongoing, requiring SPS measures to be adjusted so that they maintain their compliance with 
Article 6.1.240 The Appellate Body foresaw that its interpretation required that a regionally-
adapted SPS measures be changed when the regional conditions changed.241  This change can 
be effected by both human and natural factors.242 This dynamic and fluctuating nature of the 
this obligation has the potential to pose continual challenges for Members.243 
The Appellate Body held that, due to no indication to the contrary, Article 6 infers degree 
of freedom on to Members in determining how to ‘ensure’ adaption of their SPS measures, or 
‘recognise’ the relevant concepts within their own domestic SPS framework.244 In doing so, 
the Appellate Body prescribed no form to Members to ensure adaption of their SPS measures, 
or for recognising the relevant concepts.245 Whichever method is chosen by a Member has to 
be capable of continually adapting their SPS measures to the relevant and applicable SPS 
characteristics.246 The method also has to a have a sound legal basis (in their domestic law), 
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meaning that they must not contradict any mandatory legislation.247 This interpretation and 
finding of the Appellate Body complies to the required deference to State sovereignty, and 
ensures that Members are allowed maximum autonomy in ensuring conformity with this 
obligation, provided it is achievable in a ‘lawful way’.248  
In context of the last characteristic noted above, when interpreting and applying the 
obligation relating to regionalisation that the obligation created by Article 6.2 is case-specific. 
Article 6.1 expressly requires WTO members to take the criteria or guidelines of relevant 
international organisations into account when discharging their regionalisation obligation.249 
In the India - Agricultural Products (2015) case the Appellate Body underscored this case-
specific nature by referring to the fact that while the Terrestrial code does not recommend 
regionalisation for certain pests and diseases, it does have a chapter (Chapter 10.4) which is 
specifically devoted to ‘infection with viruses of notifiable avian influenaza’.250 This 
effectively means that where a relevant organisation has determined that the concepts of pest- 
or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence ae relevant with respect to a 
specific pest or disease, a Member is required to recognise these concepts.251 In other words, if 
the OIE Terristorial Code, for example, has recommended regionalisation for a disease, an SPS 
measure which is addressing such disease is required to take such recommendation into account 
for its adaptation to regional SPS characteristics.252 What this translates to in practice is that 
the relevant or applicable international standards set by these international organisations are 
effectively treated as WTO law, and that measures which meet with these standards enjoy 
‘substantial immunity’ from a WTO challenge.253 This practical effect is important for 
developing country Members in the sense that these countries are often underrepresented in 
international standard-setting bodies or lack the resources to effectively promote their 
interests.254  
8 6  Article 6 Interpretation and Order of Analysis  
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In determining a dispute based on Article 6, the order of analysis becomes important to the 
outcome of such dispute.255 This has been addressed by the Appellate Body in the India – 
Agricultural Products (2015) dispute which stated that “what constitutes an appropriate order 
of analysis and approach by a panel examining a claim under Article 6 may, at least in part, be 
a function of the nature of the claim and the circumstances of the case.’256 
8 7 Appellate Body’s Report (India – Agricultural Products (2015)  
Since the adoption of the Appellate Body’s Report handed down in the India – Agricultural 
Products (2015) dispute three issues have emerged in relation to the AB’s finding on regional 
adaption of SPS measures: (1) whether the importing Member’s obligation is independent of 
or contingent on the fulfilment of the exporting Member’s obligation; (2) whether the importing 
Member’s obligation of recognition (of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or 
disease prevalence ) includes the implementation of such recognition; and (3) whether the 
statement of an individual official of the importing Member may be preferred to one of its 
measures at issue.257 These three issues shall be examined further: 
8 7 1 Article 6.1: Independent or Continent Obligation? 
While there is no explicit conditional language in Article 6.1 that links it Article 6.3, the 
Appellate Body emphasised that Article 6.1 and the rest of Article 6 need to be read together.258 
Here the Appellate Body explained that an exporting Member will have difficulties with 
succeeding in a claim that the importing Member has acted inconsistently with Articles 6.1 
and/or 6.2 unless that exporting Member can demonstrate its own compliance with Article 
6.3.259 The Appellate Body, however, explicitly noted that an importing Member may act 
inconsistently with its obligation under the first sentence of Article 6.1 even without the 
objective demonstration by an exporting Member under Article 6.3, and thus found that the 
obligations in Articles 6.2 and 6.3 are not trigged by an invocation of Article 6.3.260 It thus 
seems to be that while the obligations under Article 6.1 and 6.2 are not triggered by (and are 
independent from) compliance with Article 6.3, the relationship between the obligations of 
exporting and importing Members under Article 6 are evidentiary and relative.261  
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8 7 2 Article 6.2: Recognition vs Implementation 
Does Article 6 require the implementation of the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and 
areas of low pest or disease prevalence and not merely the recognition of such concepts? The 
terms of Article 6 expressly state that the obligation is an obligation to ‘recognise’ and not an 
obligation to ‘implement’ the relevant concepts.262. The inclusion of “recognise’ and exclusion 
of “implementation” can be reconciled by looking at the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the 
words ‘ensure’; ‘adaptation’; and ‘recognise’.263 They draw the conclusion that the word 
‘recognition’ encompasses the word ‘implementation’.264  
8 7 3 The Effectiveness of a Statement made in terms of the Recognition Obligation 
India tried to argue that a statement which had been made by one of its DAHD officials in a 
letter to the US amounted to fulfilment of its regional recognition obligation as it demonstrated 
that India had exercised its legislation’s discretion to recognise the relevant concepts.265 India 
argued that in this statement given to the US in 2010 it had informed the US that it was willing 
to consider the issue of compartmentalisation.266 India contended that dispute this statement 
given to the US, the US never submitted a proper proposal to India under Article 6.3 of the SPS 
Agreement.267 The US argued against this, stating that the statement did not demonstrated that 
India had recognised the concepts of disease-free areas or areas of low disease prevalence with 
respect to AI.268 The Appellate Body found in favour of the US on this matter. There are two 
important take away points from this: firstly, the evidentiary weight of an individual officer’s 
statement against a regulatory instrument, and secondly: the acceptability of a statement as a 
means of a fulfilment of the recognition obligation which was made before the adoption of the 
regulatory instrument.269 
8 8 Conclusion of Article 6 Interpretation 
The regional adaptation obligation is a continuing obligation, in terms of which Members enjoy 
a degree of latitude in determining how to ‘ensure’ adaptation of their SPS measures (or 
‘recognise’ the relevant concepts within their domestic SPS regime); and further that this 
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obligation is context or case specific.270 Furthermore, it is now accepted that an importing 
Member’s regional adaptation obligation is independent to a proposal by an exporting 
Member.271 Further significant findings are: that a statement by an individual official of an 
importing Member cannot be understood as recognition of the concepts of disease-free areas 
and areas of low disease prevalence in preferences to its regulatory instrument which does not 
recognise these concepts.272 
 It is true that, based on the above discussed disputes, the Appellate Body and Panel seem 
to be satisfied that Article 6 successfully balances the conflicting interests of importing 
Members and exporting Members.273 While achieving this balance is a great success in 
international trade law and is sure to have positive effects it needs to be remembered that this 
balance is a fragile one, and the manner in which Article 6 (specifically the legal test found 
under Article 6.2) is interpreted and applied in future cases to come could very easily disrupt 
this balance.274 It is important that the preservation of this necessary balance is kept in mind 
when Panels and Appellate Bodies interact with Article 6 in practice. Panels within the DSB 
need to be alive to the fact that developing country Members bear a heavy burden in terms of 
the obligation to recognise pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence. This burden is worsened in instances where the measure at hand concerns a disease 
or pest which is not well known. Another factor which worsens such burden is where there are 
no recommendations given by international organisations as to the recognition of these areas.275 
These Panels also need to be alive to the administrative practices between importing and 
exporting Members when making decisions in relation to Article 6.276 
9  Issues with Article 6 of the SPS Agreement 
While Article 6 allows for the recognition of pest-or disease-free regions within a particular 
exporting country, many developing countries lack the resources necessary to take advantage 
of this provision.277 The lack of resources relates to the financial and institutional capacity to 
fight disease and pets, to evaluate the existence of pest-or disease-free regions, and to evaluate 
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the potential economic benefits of undertaking regional pest and disease eradication.278 
Financial and institutional support from developed countries in its own will not be sufficient. 
There needs to be an active simplification of procedures for proving the existence of these 
disease- an pest-free zones in order for developing countries to be able to take advantage of 
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement. 
When Members comply with the obligations set out in Article 6 they are effectively 
acknowledging that certain regions of an exporting country are disease-free.279 This operates 
not only as a control on disease, but also facilitates trade.280 The benefit of disease control will 
most commonly be more prevalent to importing Country. It has been argued that the 
implementation of regionalisation can be expected to involve a combination of attributes: the 
strengthening of procedural rules, risk analysis, comparative advantage, investments in public 
sector-regulatory infrastructures, elimination of delays in the process of recognising disease-
free areas and certain costs.281  
The challenges created by Article 6 have given rise to issues that have come before the 
SPS Committee. These issues include: the difficulties created by procedures and guidelines for 
the implementation of recognition of the concept of regionalisation including procedures for 
ensuring that areas in an exporting country are risk free; the unpredictable element in obtaining 
a time frame for recognition of risk free areas by an importing country; the adoption of new 
measures or changes in old ones demand transparency in both exporting and importing 
countries so that relevant information on procedures for recognising an area as risk free are 
immediately available; and general difficulties faced in the recognition of regions by 
international setting standards bodies and by Members.282 Developing country Members have 
to meet long established standards which have been in practice in most developed country 
Members for some time.283 As a result developing country Members start off at a disadvantage. 
These issues have been identified and addressed (or at least attempted) by the SPS 
Committee.284 
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9 1 Article 6 and the Balancing of Interests 
There have been some commentators who have questioned whether Article 6 has 
successfully found the balance between the interests of exporting Members’ concerns, of 
unduly wide SPS measures which have the potential to block the exportation of goods which 
face zero SPS risk and importing Members interests of preventing the spread of pests and 
disease within their territories. For example, does Indonesia block imports of beef from Brazil 
which have a zero risk of being infected with FMD? It is true that FMD is extremely contagious 
and thus it is understandable that Indonesia would only import beef from territories which have 
been granted FMD free status. It, however, also needs to be considered that this import ban on 
all Brazil’s beef and beef products fails to recognise the fact that there are areas within Brazil’s 
territory which are free from FMD and hold the same sanitary standards as beef and beef 
products from FMD free countries. There is, therefore, the possibility that by failing to adopt 
the principle of regionalisation, Indonesia is blocking beef and beef products from certain areas 
of Brazil which have a zero risk of FMD infection. Members have voiced their concerns 
regarding importing Members’ slow, complex and non-transparent administrative procedures 
which have the effect of undermining efforts and investments to establish.285 Here importing 
Members have argued that a careful assessment, pertaining to the recognition of pest- or 
disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, is necessary so as to ensure 
prevention of entry and spread of pests and diseases.286 As a result the Guidelines to Further 
Practical Implementation of Article 6 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures287 was produced. These guidelines, however, clarify that they ‘do not 
provide any legal interpretation or modification to the [SPS] Agreement itself’; but instead set 
out general disciplines and administrative steps with the main focus on the recognition of 
PDFAs.288 While these Guidelines are a welcomed step towards efficiency in terms of Article 
6 they are not without their problematic aspects. The main problem is the assumption of a 
certain level of capacity, in terms of knowledge; know-how; and recourses on the part of 
importing Members.289 An illustration of this assumption: importing Members are required to 
explain their requirements and procedures required for the recognition of pest- or disease-free 
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areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence290.291 This requirement is problematic because 
unless the importing Member is familiar with the specific pests/diseases it is obviously 
problematic for them to articulate what types of information would be regarded as sufficient to 
enable itself to determine the status of the specific pest/diseases in given areas.292 
9 2 The Role of International Organisations 
This is a similar issue to that of the issue of the role of international organisations within the 
context of harmonisation and Article 3 of the SPS Agreement. Article 6 refers to the roles of 
relevant of international organisations in a very brief manner. Article 6.1 specifies certain 
factors for consideration when assessing the SPS characteristics of a region, one of them being 
‘… appropriate criteria or guidelines which may be developed by the international 
organisations …”. Saika explains that because we are dealing with the control of pests and 
disease, the relevant international organisations would be the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), amongst others293 
There are two main problems in this regard: firstly, the under representation of the developing 
world in these organisations which create these obligations; and the outsourcing of the 
responsibility of setting such standards to a body outside of the WTO and thus that does not 
have to subscribe to the consensus basis of all WTO law. These two issues have been discussed 
in length in regard to the harmonisation obligation created by Article 3 of the SPS Agreement 
and therefore shall for efficiency purposes not be repeated. It suffices to know that there is a 
similar problem faced when looking at regionalisation and Article 6. The issue of 
underrepresentation and lack of ability to properly participate in international organisations and 
Committees cannot be understated. In a joint publication issued by the UN’s Food and 
Agriculture Organization and the World Trade Organisation it was stated that “the participation 
in the development of international food standards for trade is essential if countries are to reap 
the benefits of booming global trade and prepare for imminent technological changes”.294 The 
Report advises developing country to invest in their capacity and skills so as to achieve 
effective engagement in institutions (and organisations) such as the WTO and the Codex 
Alimentarius. This Report further makes the statement that effective engagement has the 
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potential to make the USD 1.7 trillion international market (in agriculture) more inclusive, by 
allowing small-scale food producers and processors to enter into large scale value chains.  
This Report, concerningly so, goes on to illustrate some of the newer challenges which 
developing countries must gear up to face in the future digitalisation, new production and 
processing technologies and e-commerce, as well as labelling trends, new trade deals and 
changing dietary and consumer preferences. All these occurrences have the effect of changing 
the food trade and food safety landscape. Developing countries must try take effective steps in 
ensuring that they do not get left behind.    
The problems that Developing Countries face, both in relation to Article 3 and Article 6, 
cannot be divorced from one another. Often, by finding a solution to one of these problems, or 
at least helping to elevate one of the burdens carried by developing countries in implementing 
their WTO obligations, a ‘trickledown effect’ will be felt by developing country members. The 
benefit will be experienced in more areas than the original focus of the aid. For example, where 
developing countries are given aid in the sense of resource capacity, i.e. financial aid, they will 
not only be able to bear the costs of harmonisation and regionalisation more effectively, but 
they will also find themselves in a better position to effectively participate within the committee 
meetings and international organisations. In other words, by receiving resource capacity 
(financial aid) they will be able to ensure better representation in the international organisations 
which set standards for harmonisations (as well as for regionalisation) and advocate for their 
interests in the SPS Committee Meetings more effectively. This is also true for the transfer of 
know-how and technical expertise.  
10  Policy suggestions and possible solutions for developing countries 
10 1 Developed Countries’ Role  
SPS measures are a major factor which influences the ability of developing countries to exploit 
export opportunities for agricultural and food products in developed Members’ markets.295 
While it is true that the international community has attempted to overcome trade distortive 
effects of SPS measures through the adoption and implementation of the SPS Agreements it 
seems to be slightly inconsiderate to developing countries’ lack of resources, which are 
necessary to exploit these opportunities offered by the Agreement.296 The numerous concerns 
which have been raised by the developing country Members’ illustrates a need to facilitate the 
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better inclusion of developing countries in the operation of the SPS Agreement.297 I do not 
suggest that it is the Developed Countries’ sole responsibility to ensure the Developing 
Countries (and LDCs) overcome the many obstacles which they face. Neither do I expect 
Developed Countries to expose their markets, consumers or environments to SPS risks in order 
to promote exports from Developing Countries. This would be too much to ask of Developed 
Countries and would not be fair. What is fair, is to ask the Developed Countries to remain alive 
to the specific challenges that Developing Countries face. One manner in which the Developed 
Countries can achieve this is to initiate regular communication with their Developing Country 
counterparts. In such communications they should actively inquire as what Developing 
Countries’ specific concerns are and the challenges they are facing in the context of the 
interpretation, application and interpretation of SPS measures. Developed Countries should go 
further than this and use the information derived from such communication to ensure that their 
actions in the context of their SPS measures do not add to such challenges, and where possible 
act to alleviate such challenges.  
Mayeda gives three possible solutions to the burdens felt by developing countries in 
context of international standard-setting. The first solution is to transfer both funds and 
expertise from developed countries to developing countries to help the latter to conduct 
domestic risk assessments and undertake scientific assessments of suggested international 
standards.298 The second is for developing countries to share scientific research and risk 
assessment information’s with one another.299 The third solution is to promote co-operation 
among developing countries so that they are able to develop a cross country network or formal 
body to conduct such evaluations.300 I suggest a combination of these three solutions, with a 
bigger emphasis on the last two as they will have a more long term beneficial effect for the 
developing Members. 
10 2 Mutual Recognition Agreements  
There is also a possibility that there is a solution to be found in Mutual Recognition Agreements 
(MRAs)? The SPS Agreement, itself, encourages countries to enter into MRAs.301 While this 
might seem to be an easy, straightforward and therefore obvious solution this is not the reality. 
Offering this as a solution to the multiple problems faced by developing countries in the face 
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of the SPS Agreements would not be a real solution. This is due to the costs involved in the 
negotiation and ensuring compliance with these agreements. In practice only, a small number 
of MRAs involve developing countries.302 Facilitating developing countries participation in 
MRAs requires capacity building incentives similar to those necessary in the context of 
international standard-setting.303  
Aside from this issue, MRAs are not free from their own problems. Some voice concerns 
that MTA promote discrimination between states that are participating in MRAs and those that 
are not.304 While MRAs come with their own unique issues, where Developing Countries are 
placed in a position where they are able to effectively negotiate, MRAs can offer individual 
countries  specific and tailor-made solutions to the unique and specific challenges they face. 
10 3 The Benefits of Transparency 
While the SPS Agreement (as well as the TBT Agreement) encourages members to use 
international standards (Article 3 of the SPS Agreement) it does not set out a specific procedure 
for how these standards are to be established.305 Placing the legislative function for determining 
and setting SPS standards outside of the WTO avoids the consensus required in the WTO 
system. Here some commentators suggest, in order to provide greater transparency, the 
establishment of a harmonised procedure for SPS standard-setting bodies. 306 They further 
suggest that these procedures should attempt to set standards on the basis of consensus, and 
that the standards set ensure adequate representation by developing countries.307 I suggest that 
the WTO acts to create a set of procedures that are to be followed, by both Members and 
International Organisations, when setting SPS Standards. This will create more transparency 
within the process of the SPS Standard Setting. In the creation and adoption of such it is of 
critical importance that Developing Countries are given an opportunity to effectively 
participate.  
It must be noted, however, that while transparency in the standard setting process is 
helpful, it does little to ensure that developing countries have the requisite institutional capacity 
and financial resources necessary to effectively represent their interests before such 
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institutional bodies. 308 The problem in this regard is that developing countries often lack both 
the technical ability to conduct risk-assessment as well as the organisational structures to 
effectively respond to proposed regulations.309 
10 4 The Role of the SPS Committee 
Lastly, the SPS Committee has the potential to act as a forum for the exchange of information 
with regards to the implementation of the SPS Agreement.310 This potential is, however, not 
being reached and developing members are finding themselves unable to make full use of these 
bodies.311 The SPS Committee is not doing enough aid Developing Members. This is (once 
again) due to the challenges in conforming with the SPS measures of various countries, the 
difficulties arising in setting domestic standards and the task of challenging the standards set 
by importing countries.312 The SPS Committee should prioritise the objective of aiding 
Developing Countries fulfil the obligations created by the SPS Agreement. The SPS Committee 
should take up a more direct mandate focusing on helping, guiding and supporting the 
Developing Countries fulfil their SPS Obligations.  
11 Resolving the Dispute Between Indonesia and Brazil DS506 
The outcome of this dispute would not only affect Indonesia and Brazil. A number of WTO 
Members have requested to join the consultations, thereby illustrating the interest that the rest 
of the WTO has in the solution and outcome of this case. The European Union; Australia; the 
United States; New Zealand; the Chinese Taipei all requested to join the consultations 
requested Brazil, pursuant to Article 4.11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Indonesia 
has informed the Dispute Settlement Body that it had accepted these requests to join the 
consultations. There are big trading nations which have expressed their interest in the outcome 
of this dispute, their input given during the consultations will most likely be valuable insight 
into the way in which they view the obligations of harmonisation (Article 3) and regionalisation 
(Article 6). However, it is worth noting this will be a developed country view on these 
obligations and it is therefore important for the WTO Dispute Settlement Body not to lose sight 
of the original parties to the dispute and the special interests and concerns that the developing 
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country Members have been expressing for a while. Using the entire above discussion, we can 
speculate on the most likely outcome concerning the disputes on the following facts.  
The two main allegations relating to the conversation held in this paper is (a) that 
Indonesia have affected and implemented sanitary measures which are not based on 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations and further are not scientifically 
justified and more restrictive than necessary for achieving an appropriate level of protection. 
And (b) the fact that Indonesia only accepts imports of bovine meat from countries that have 
their entire territory declared free of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), regardless of the fact that 
bovine meat disease-free states or regions (with or without vacation) holds the same sanitary 
status. 
11 1 Resolution of the First Allegation – Harmonisation 
As to the first allegation, Brazil is essentially arguing that Indonesia is in breach with the 
obligations imposed upon them by Article 3.1; 3.2; and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. For Brazil 
to be successful with this claim they will have to prove the basic elements of it first: i.e. that 
the measure(s) that they have identified is in fact an SPS measure. Here they have to establish 
that the measure(s) at issue is a measure which has one of three aims: either the aim of 
protection of human, plant, or animal life and/or health from food borne risks; or it must be a 
measure that has the aim of protection of human, plant or animal life/health from risks 
occurring from pests and diseases, or a measure which aims to prevent or limit other damage 
caused by risks resulting from the presence of pests. Secondly, they will have to establish that 
the measure affects international trade. This will obviously be an easy task as the measure 
clearly has an effect on the import of bovine meat and thus as a result can be said to have an 
effect on international trade.  
Can Indonesia defend the claim that its measures are in conflict with Article 3 of the SPS 
Agreement? In requiring harmonisation of SPS measures, Article 3 creates three distinct 
manners in which a Member can comply with the obligation to harmonise their SPS measures 
– therefore a Member does not need to show compliance with all three provisions found in 
Article 3, showing compliance with one of them will suffice. Brazil, however, argues that 
Indonesia has failed to comply with any of the methods of harmonisation as found in Article 
3. Indonesia will be found to be in violation of Article 3.3 if it is shown that their measure(s) 
constitutes a higher level of protection. However, if Indonesia can demonstrate that their 
measure(s), which results in a higher level of protection, has scientific justification and is the 
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result of a level of protection chosen in a manner consistent with Articles 5.1 – 5.8. Thus, if 
Brazil proves that Indonesia’s measure is a result of a higher level of protection than that 
created by the international standards it is not the end for the discussion for Indonesia. They 
can still bring themselves into compliance with Article 3.3 if they can provide the scientific 
justification for such higher level of protection; and that the level of protection was chosen in 
accordance with the provisions set out in Article 5.1 to 5.8. 
If, however, Indonesia fails to bring themselves into compliance with Article 3.3 they 
still have Article 3.2 and 3.1 at their disposal and can thus be in compliance with Article 3. To 
follow Article 3.2 Indonesia will be faced with the task of demonstrating that their SPS 
measure(s) embody an international standard. Indonesia will be assisted in this regard, by the 
fact that the SPS Agreement creates a presumption of compliance. I.e. if Indonesia can prove 
that their measure(s) conform to the international standard (or embody the international 
standard) their measures will be assumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement, and 
accordingly to comply with the Article 3 obligation. This presumption can, of course be 
rebutted.   
Should Indonesia fail to prove compliance with Article 3.3 and Article 3.2 they can still 
establish compliance with Article 3. Establishing that a measure complies with Article 3.1 was 
made relatively easier by the Appellate Body in the EC – Hormone case.313 Here all Indonesia 
will have to allege and prove is that their measure is ‘founded’, ‘based’, or ‘built’ upon an 
international standard. Here they do not need to prove that the measure incorporates all 
elements of the international standard, it will suffice to illustrate that their measure merely does 
not conflict the standard and incorporates certain elements of the international standard.  
This demonstrates that the SPS’s obligation to harmonise SPS measures is worded in 
such a way that it does not create a very strong or strict obligation. It gives Members a lot of 
leeway in how they comply with these obligations and further on how strictly they wish to 
comply. Brazil will effectively have to establish that Indonesia’s SPS measures cannot be 
reconciled with the international standard and therefore that Indonesia’s SPS measures 
constitute a departure from the international standard. Should the WTO and/or the SPS 
Committee wish to create a stricter obligation resulting in more ‘across the board’ 
harmonisation they will first have to ensure that the developing country Members are 
adequately and proportionately represented in the bodies which set the international standards. 
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If they fail to do so, they will in effect be creating a barrier to trade that disproportionately more 
difficult for developing countries to overcome when trying to trade within the international 
market. Creating disproportionately more obstacles for Members of the WTO that are 
developing countries acts against the WTO’s goal of improving the welfare of the citizens of 
WTO Members. The WTO has many developing Members, in fact most of its Members are in 
fact Developing Members, the WTO, it therefore needs to ensure that their interests are actively 
protected.  
Indonesia’s SPS measures regarding the importation of bovine meat and bovine meat 
products do appear to constitute a higher level of protection that the level of protection created 
by the international standard. Unless Indonesia can provide scientific justification this, or that 
this is justified within their specific circumstances Indonesia will be unable to rely on Article 
3.3.  Brazil therefore will have the burden of proving that Indonesia’s SPS measure is not 
“based on” nor “embodies” the international standard relevant to FMD. If Brazil can prove that 
it is not even based on the international standard, it will be able to prove that Indonesia’s SPS 
measure is in fact inconsistent with Article 3. If Brazil can establish that Indonesia’s SPS 
creates a level of protection significantly higher than the international standard the Panel could 
possibly find that this constitutes a departure from the international standard. This would negate 
any finding that Indonesia’s SPS measure is in a fact based on or embodies the national 
standard.  
The inclusion of cut-off levels (of allowed divergence), as advocated for in the paper 
quoted above written by Neugebauer, would be useful in this dispute. It would mean that it 
would be easier for Indonesia to determine whether their SPS measure departures too greatly 
from the international standard and therefore whether they need to provide scientific 
justification for such deviation. It would also be beneficial to Brazil as it would provide them 
with the evidence required to argue that Indonesia’s SPS measure is in fact inconsistent with 
Article 3. The inclusion of these levels would mean that the determination of whether a measure 
is “based on” or “embodies” an international standard is based on something concrete and 
accessible to Members. At the moment this determination seems to be based on abstract 
interpretation of the words “based on” and “embodies”. This has created confusion and 
frustration with the text of the SPS Agreement.  
11 2 Resolution of the Second Allegation – Regionalisation 
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The second related allegation made, that is relevant in the context of this paper, the allegation 
that Indonesia only accepts imports of bovine meat from countries that have their entire 
territory declared as free of FMD, regardless of the fact that bovine meat from disease-free 
states or regions, with or without vaccination, holds the same sanitary status. Brazil alleges that 
this measure amounts to a failure to adopt the principle of regionalisation. In this regards, 
Article 6.1 and 6.2 create the obligation of adaptation for Indonesia, while Article 6.3 of the 
SPS Agreement creates an obligation for Brazil. Article 6.1 creates the general obligation for 
Indonesia to adapt its SPS measures, in this regard the measures specific to FMD, to sanitary 
and phytosanitary characteristics of the origin and destination of bovine meat products. Here 
Indonesia will have to pay specific attention to factors listed in Article 6.1 but could be obliged 
to pay attention to other (unlisted) factors if the facts so require. This obligation is case-specific, 
what is required from Indonesia in the fulfilment of Article 6.1 (and 6.2) is therefore dependent 
on the specific circumstances. Here it should be noted that Indonesia will have to take heed of 
any relevant criterial or guidelines given by international organisations when fulfilling their 
regionalisation obligations. Article 6.2 creates the specific obligation on Indonesia to recognise 
the concept of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence based on 
the existence of certain factors have been proven or established. The recognition of these areas 
cannot be a mere abstract recognition. The obligation to recognise these areas or regions is not 
a separate obligation of regionalisation or adaptation, but instead is part of the overall 
obligation of regionalisation. An element of this obligation has been said to give an exporting 
Member (in this case Brazil) an (effective) opportunity to make a claim that there are certain 
regions or areas within its territory that would qualify as pest- or disease-free areas and areas 
of low pest or disease prevalence in the context of FMD. Here it is unclear what exactly will 
qualify as an ‘effective opportunity. What is clear, however, is that if a Panel is to find that this 
effective opportunity was denied to Brazil then Indonesia will be found in be in breach of 
Article 6.2 and therefore with the regionalisation obligations as a whole. Indonesia will have 
to do more than point to legislation that introduces and defines the concept of ‘regionalisation’; 
or to regulations that contain a mere reference to the Terrestrial Code.  
For Brazil to be successful in these allegations, they will however have to prove that the specific 
region(s) within their territory are in fact, and will remain, pest- or disease-free areas and areas 
of low pest or disease prevalence. Here Brazil will have to adduce evidence attesting to this 
claim. Proving such regions exist is not the extent of their obligations. They will further have 
to provide reasonable access to Indonesia to allow for inspection, testing and any other relevant 
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proceedings so that they are can satisfy, in the form of an objective determination, themselves 
that these areas or regions are in fact pest- or disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease 
prevalence. 
11 3 The Panel 
If this issue does go before a Panel, such Panel has to be awake to the fact that the order in 
which the analysis is conducted is important and will have an outcome on the case. Here, the 
panel has to decide on such order by considering the nature of the claim along with the 
circumstances of the case.  
The challenges which are faced in the implementation of the recognition of these pest- or 
disease-free areas and areas of low pest or disease prevalence, specifically in terms of the 
procedures to be followed; the issue of an unpredictable timeframe; and the implementation of 
new SPS measures or changes to existing measures are issues which both Brazil and Indonesia 
face. Thus, if this matter is to go before a Panel, it is important that the Panel bears these 
challenges in mind when it imposes obligations onto these nations. The fact that both these 
Members are developing countries presents an opportunity for the Panel to make a finding 
which is alive to the special needs of such Members and to accommodate their shortcomings 
and aid them in their attempts to participate, implement and effect the SPS Agreement. The 
needs of (and challenging faces) Developing Countries are most certainly not identical to each. 
I do not expect the Panel to identify each and every unique problem faced by a Developing 
Country. I do however think it is reasonable to expect a Panel to be mindful of the status of a 
party to a dispute as either developed or developing. Where it is hearing a matter involving a 
Developing Country Panels (and Appellate Bodies) need to precaution not to overlook the 
specific obstacles and challenges that Developing Countries face. The Members which have 
requested to join these consultations should also be careful not to drown out the voices of the 
developing countries in the course of the discussion.  
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